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SUMMARY TABLE 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Output (Real Annual Growth %) 
     
Private Consumer Expenditure 4.0 1.6 3.0 2.5 2.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 3.5 3.9 6.4 7.0 5.3 
Investment 51.7 -31.0 9.8 7.1 7.6 
Exports 4.4 7.8 8.9 4.2 4.3 
Imports 18.5 -9.4 7.0 6.0 5.9 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 5.0 7.2 6.7 4.0 3.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) 11.5 4.4 5.9 3.4 2.6 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
     
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.7 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.5 1.5 4.2 4.4 4.6 
      
Labour Market 
     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,133 2,195 2,250 2,324 2,375 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 195 158 145 110 102 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 8.4 6.7 5.7 4.5 4.1 
      
Public Finance 
     
General Government Balance (€bn) -1.8 -0.8 0.0 -0.7 -1.2 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 73.5 68.5 64.8 62.8 58.0 
      
External Trade 
     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -11.4 24.9 29.0 23.2 18.5 
Current Account (% of GNP) -5.1 10.7 11.5 8.8 6.7 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 99.9 104.3 4.4 1.4 3.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.6 32.0 8.1 1.5 6.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 69.0 79.4 15.1 4.8 9.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 383.8 8.9 0.0 8.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.5 1.6 
   
Final Demand 554.6 601.1 8.4 0.9 7.4 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  263.3 284.4 8.7 1.0 7.7 
Statistical Discrepancy 2.8 1.8 
   
GDP at Market Prices 294.1 318.5 8.3 1.5 6.7 
Net Factor Payments  -61.0 -66.6 
   
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 251.8 8.0 1.9 5.9 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.5 3.8 0.3 9.4 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 85.7 91.8 6.1 7.1 
Other 113.3 117.3 4.0 3.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.0 0.2 
  
Statistical Discrepancy -2.8 -3.0 
  
Net Domestic Product 250.6 271.7 21.1 8.4 
Net Factor Payments -61.0 -66.6 -5.7 9.3 
National Income 189.6 205.1 15.4 8.1 
Depreciation 72.0 74.8 2.8 3.9 
GNP at Factor Cost 261.6 279.8 18.3 7.0 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.4 -28.0 0.4 -1.5 
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 251.8 18.7 8.0 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 89.3 99.5 10.2 
F -59.8 -65.4 -5.6 
Net Transfers -4.6 -5.1 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 24.9 29.0 4.1 
as % of GNP 10.7 11.5 
1 
1.6 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 104.3 108.7 4.2 1.7 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 32.0 35.1 9.7 2.5 7.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 79.4 87.7 10.3 3.0 7.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 383.8 405.2 5.6 1.3 4.2 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.6 3.0 
   
Final Demand 601.1 639.6 6.4 1.8 4.6 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  284.4 305.9 7.6 1.5 6.0 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 318.5 333.5 4.7 0.7 4.0 
Net Factor Payments  -66.6 -70.4 
   
GNP at Market Prices 251.8 263.2 4.5 1.1 3.3 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.8 3.9 0.1 2.6 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 91.8 99.2 7.4 8.1 
Other 117.3 120.3 3.0 2.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.2 0.2 
 
 
Statistical Discrepancy -3.0 -3.0   
Net Domestic Product 271.7 285.1 13.4 4.9 
Net Factor Payments -66.6 -70.4 -3.7 5.6 
National Income 205.1 214.8 9.7 4.7 
Depreciation 74.8 77.5 2.7 3.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 279.8 292.2 12.4 4.4 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.0 -29.0 -1.0 3.6 
GNP at Market Prices 251.8 263.2 11.4 4.5 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 99.5 99.2 -0.3 
F -65.4 -70.4 -5.0 
Net Transfers -5.1 -5.6 -0.6   
Balance on Current Account 29.0 23.2 -5.8 
as % of GNP 11.5 8.8 -2.2 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2020 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 108.7 113.3 4.2 1.9 2.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 35.1 37.4 6.5 1.1 5.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 87.7 97.4 11.1 2.5 7.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 405.2 428.7 5.8 1.5 4.3 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 639.6 679.8 6.3 2.0 4.5 
less:    
   
Imports of Goods and Services  305.9 329.1 7.6 1.7 5.9 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 333.5 350.5 5.1 1.9 3.2 
Net Factor Payments  -70.4 -74.9 
   
GNP at Market Prices 263.2 275.7 4.7 1.6 2.6 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.9 4.0 0.1 2.6 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 99.2 106.1 6.9 6.9 
Other 120.3 123.9 3.6 3.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.2 0.2 
  
Statistical Discrepancy -3.0 -3.0 
  
Net Domestic Product 285.1 300.3 15.2 5.3 
Net Factor Payments -70.4 -74.9 -4.5 6.4 
National Income 214.8 225.4 10.7 5.0 
Depreciation 77.5 80.1 2.6 3.4 
GNP at Factor Cost 292.2 305.5 13.3 4.6 
Taxes less Subsidies -29.0 -29.9 -0.8 2.9 
GNP at Market Prices 263.2 275.7 12.5 4.7 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 99.2 99.5 0.3 
F -70.4 -74.9 -4.5 
Net Transfers -5.6 -6.1 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 23.2 18.5 -4.7 
as % of GNP 8.8 6.7 -1.7 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
While a number of international concerns continue to cast a shadow on the 
domestic economy, both taxation receipts and labour market indicators suggest 
that the Irish economy continues to perform strongly in 2019. Output is still 
forecast to grow by 4.0 per cent in 2019 before moderating somewhat at 3.2 per 
cent in 2020. Unemployment is set to fall to 4.5 per cent by the end of the 
present year and to 4.1 per cent at the end of the next year. All forecasts, unless 
otherwise stated, maintain the Commentary’s baseline assumption that the 
trading status of the United Kingdom remains equivalent to that of a full 
European Union Member State. 
 
The Irish economy appears to be operating at its full potential level. The 
continued strong performance of the labour market has resulted in a significant 
increase in both nominal and real wages in recent years. While wage increases 
due to productivity are warranted, care must be exercised to ensure that the 
competitiveness of the domestic economy is maintained. Fiscal policy will be 
important in tempering the degree of demand-side pressures in the domestic 
economy in that regard. 
 
Greater vigilance will also be required to ensure that large infrastructural 
projects, which are essential for sustainable growth, are delivered on an efficient 
basis. A number of high profile cases have emerged recently where the final costs 
of certain projects seems to be significantly different from initial estimates. Given 
the pace of growth in the economy at present, increases in expenditure must 
focus on capital projects that increase the productive capacity of the economy. 
 
While the performance of the economy continues to exceed that of most other 
European countries, it is subject to heightened levels of uncertainty. Consumer 
and producer sentiment indices have all reported significant declines in investor 
confidence about future prospects for the Irish economy. Inevitably, much of this 
uncertainty reflects the ongoing process of the UK withdrawal from the European 
Union. While analysis of the impacts of the UK withdrawal has inevitably focussed 
on the future impacts on the domestic economy, it is clear that Brexit has already 
had a materially negative impact on the Irish economy. Ongoing trade frictions 
between the United States and China are also potentially contributing to lower 
investment due to global uncertainties. 
 
Finally, research published in the Commentary highlights the importance of 
carbon taxes as a policy lever. Tovar Reaños and Lynch (2019) demonstrate that 
carbon taxes can help both to effectively reduce the level of carbon emissions in 
the economy, while also addressing issues of income inequality.  
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The International Economy 
 
The international economy section has now been amended to also include a 
section on international financial developments. This has previously been in the 
Monetary and Financial section. Therefore, the section now deals initially with 
the overall performance of the domestic economy’s main trading partners, then 
international financial developments, and finally the implications for the traded 
sector of the domestic economy. 
 
The increase in trade tensions and in particular the adoption of new tariffs rates 
between the world’s two largest economies, the US and China, has had an 
adverse impact on global economic activity. While importers of Irish goods have 
largely been exempt from protectionist measures, the indirect effects of the 
resulting slowdown in multilateral trade activity could limit the growth potential 
for the Irish economy. This slowdown has also been observed in a European 
context. These uncertainties have been incorporated into the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook as of April 2019, which revised world output growth down yet 
again, declining from 3.5 in the January issue to 3.3 per cent for 2019.1 
 
According to flash estimates of year-on-year real GDP growth, economic activity 
for the EU28 remained at 1.5 per cent while the Euro Area grew by 1.2 per cent. 
France, Germany, Spain and Italy experienced a 1.1, 0.7, 2.4 and 0.1 per cent 
annual increase in real GDP, respectively. These remain broadly similar to annual 
growth rates exhibited in Q4 2018. As highlighted in Figure 1, the moderation in 
economic activity appears to be largely driven by weaker private consumption 
and poor export performance. As of March 2019, EU28 unemployment fell to 
6.4 per cent. Inflation in the Euro Area averaged 1.4 per cent in Q1 2019, rising to 
1.7 per cent in April. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1  International Monetary Fund (2019). World Economic Outlook, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, April 2019. 
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FIGURE 1 EU28 – CONTRIBUTIONS TO YEAR-ON-YEAR GDP GROWTH (PERCENTAGE POINT 
CONTRIBUTIONS) 
 
Sources:  Eurostat, GDP and main components. 
 
As of April 2019, the EU began trade negotiations with the US, aiming to address 
both a product conformity assessment (which seeks to enable firms to more 
easily prove products meet technical requirements) and a reciprocal elimination 
of tariffs on industrial products. A recent analysis of the proposed tariff change 
estimates that EU and US exports would grow by 8 per cent and 9 per cent, 
respectively, after the policy change.2 Given the EU’s recent difficulty in 
maintaining trade competitiveness as well as increased frictions in US-China 
trade, these negotiations do present opportunities for global economic 
development and trade liberalisation.  
 
Real GDP growth in the United Kingdom improved significantly in Q1 2019, driven 
largely by high levels of stockpile accumulation and strong production sector 
performance relative to services (Figure 2). Gross value added indices for both 
the production and manufacturing sectors yielded moderate annual growth for 
the quarter, following a sizeable decline in 2018. Unemployment has fallen to 
3.8 per cent in Q1 2019, its lowest rate since the 1970s. As vacancies grow and 
labour supply shortages manifest, competitive pressures are likely to fuel further 
increases to nominal incomes. In Q1 2019, average weekly earnings grew year-
on-year by 3.2 per cent (+1.3 per cent in real terms). As seen in 2017, real 
earnings growth can be quite sensitive to currency depreciation. Given that the 
 
                                                          
 
2  European Commission (2019). ‘Liberalization of tariffs on industrial goods between the United States of America and 
the European Union: An economic analysis’, Brussels: European Commission.   
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UK has a high import dependency ratio for items such as food and medicine, any 
shift in the value of the pound results in significant inflationary pressure and 
undermines real earnings growth. 
 
FIGURE 2 KEY UK ECONOMIC INDICATORS, YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE (%) 
  
 
Sources:  ONS, gross domestic product, latest quarter on corresponding quarter of previous year (LHS); ONS, GDP output approach – low-
level aggregates, GVA chained volume index (constant prices), latest quarter on corresponding quarter of previous year (RHS). 
 
A No-Deal Brexit outcome was narrowly avoided in March, following an extension 
of the withdrawal date to 31 October 2019. With a new Conservative leader due 
to be selected before the end of July, uncertainty regarding the UK government’s 
anticipated stance on Brexit will likely intensify over the coming weeks. The main 
opposition party, the Labour Party, has suggested a potential Customs Union 
relationship between the UK and the EU. A Customs Union implies no tariffs or 
quotas for multilateral goods trade, however the trade of services would face 
greater frictions, particularly for financial markets, and a lack of freedom of 
movement would further undermine competitiveness. A recent National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) study assesses the long-run impact of 
such a deal on the UK. Hantzsche and Young (2019) estimate that under a 
Customs Union deal, the UK economy would be 3.1 per cent smaller after ten 
years relative to the UK remaining in the EU. Reduced migration contributes to 
1.3 percentage points of this loss, while greater frictions in the trade of services 
results in a 1.5 percentage point contribution. Goods are softly impacted, 
contributing to 0.3 percentage points of the overall GDP loss.3  
 
The US economy grew at an annual rate of 3.2 per cent in Q1 2019. This was 
driven largely by a 3.7 per cent reduction in imports. Similar to the first quarter of 
last year, consumption made a lacklustre contribution to overall growth. As of 
 
                                                          
 
3  Hantzsche, A. and G. Young (2019). The Economic Impact on the United Kingdom of a Customs Union Deal with the 
European Union, London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research.  
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March 2019, the US unemployment rate declined to 3.6 per cent; as with the UK, 
this rate is a historically low rate, which has not been observed since the late 
1960s. While there has been some debate about the quality of jobs in the labour 
market, it is important to note that the percentage of multiple job holders in the 
US has remained stable at approximately 5 per cent of total employment since 
2005 and that the share of those employed working part time remains at a  
ten-year low of 17 per cent.  
 
The US trade balance for goods improved slightly in Q1 2019 relative to the same 
period last year, following a 2.4 per cent year-on-year increase in goods exports 
while imports of goods only grew by a modest 0.6 per cent. Figure 3 highlights a 
significant decline in bilateral trade between the US and China. The introduction 
of new tariffs throughout 2018 and the increase in tariff rates following failed  
US-China trade negotiations in the first half of 2019 are likely to lead to a further 
deterioration in overall US trade activity.  
 
FIGURE 3 US-CHINA SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, Y-O-Y GROWTH (%) 
 
Source:  United States Census Bureau, US Export and Import data for goods. 
 
Real GDP in China increased by 6.4 per cent in Q1 2019, year-on-year. Though the 
widely expected slowdown in economic activity has yet to occur, policymakers 
are taking precautionary measures to dampen any future shocks to the domestic 
economy. In particular, the difficulties in the Chinese economy are related to the 
ongoing trade dispute with the US, a tightening of financial market regulations 
and various measures put into action to curb speculative bubbles forming in the 
real estate sector. The recent introduction of the government’s fiscal stimulus 
programme aims to prop up the relatively weakened economy. Given the 
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increase in US tariff rates in May, further action may be required to maintain the 
government’s GDP growth target of between 6.0 to 6.5 per cent.  
 
Strong public investment and an improvement in Japan’s trade balance resulted 
in real GDP growth of 2.1 per cent in Q1 2019, year-on-year. Similarl to 
developments among other strong global players, overall trade activity declined. 
The improvement in the trade balance came about due to a decline in imports 
which were larger than the decline seen in exports. As of December 2018, final 
estimates suggest there has been an 8.9 per cent decline in the size of the 
working population over the past ten years. Job vacancy ratios remain at record 
levels while unemployment rose slightly to 2.5 per cent in March. Fiscal pressures 
continue to accumulate as Japan faces ever growing challenges from growth in 
public debt and an ageing population. Unpopular sales tax hikes are likely to 
continue being imposed in 2019 in order to address such challenges. Sales tax 
receipts are expected to account for roughly a third of total tax revenue relative 
to 18 per cent in the late 1980s.  
 
Figure 4 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth produced by the major 
institutions of their respective economies. Each forecast signals minimum and 
maximum forecasts with point values identifying the median of forecasts. These 
forecasts suggest a broad-based expectation of a moderation in economic growth 
across the majority of developed economies.  
 
FIGURE 4 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
 Euro Area     United States     United Kingdom 
  
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
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average tariff rate on US imports from China was 3.1 per cent, reflective of WTO 
‘Most Favoured Nations’ tariff rates.4 As of September 2018, US elevated tariffs 
applied directly on Chinese goods resulted in the average tariff rate climbing to 
12.4 per cent. Following failed trade negotiations up until May 2019, the US 
administration raised tariff rates on $200 billion worth of Chinese products from 
10 to 25 per cent, leading to the overall tariff rate now averaging 18.3 per cent. 
The study finds this rate may rise further, should threats of imposing these 25 per 
cent tariff rates to nearly all US imports of Chinese goods be acted upon. Coupled 
with high tariffs on the remainder of Chinese imports, this would cause the 
overall average tariff rate to increase to 27.8 per cent. Such a broad imposition of 
high tariffs between the world’s two largest economies would have a significantly 
adverse impact on global growth. Should global trade activity diminish, 
opportunities for small open economies like Ireland become increasingly limited. 
 
Possibly expecting the next phase of the trade war to proceed, the IMF published 
a brief analysis which models how a 25 per cent tariff rate on all US imports of 
Chinese goods would affect the global economy.5 In the case of China and the US, 
bilateral trade falls by 25 to 30 per cent after a year, ranging further from 30 to 
70 per cent in the long run across various models. Both economies would face 
real GDP losses, ranging from 0.3 to 0.6 percentage points for the US and 0.5 to 
1.5 percentage points for China. For third countries, the net effect on exports is 
positive, particularly in the cases of Canada and Mexico, though this will involve 
reduced exports to China and large increases in exports to the US. Overall, the 
IMF analysis estimates a global reduction in real GDP of just under 0.25 
percentage points, should the US proceed with threats of further tariff 
extensions.  
 
International Financial Developments 
As a result of Ireland’s openness to international trade and capital flows, 
fluctuations in international financial markets can have a significant impact on the 
domestic economy. Escalating international trade tensions, primarily between 
the United States and China, pose a threat to both global economic growth and 
financial markets in the latter half of 2019. Other downside risks such as slowing 
growth in Europe and uncertainty around Brexit could also have a significant 
negative impact on financial markets going forward.  
 
 
                                                          
 
4  Brown, P. and E.Y. Zhang (2019). ‘Trump’s 2019 Protection Could Push China Back to Smoot-Hawley Tariff Levels’, 
Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
5  Caceres, C., D. Cerdeiro, R. Mano, R. Portillo and M. Santoro (2019). ‘The Global Macro and Micro Effects of a US-
China Trade Dispute: Insights from Three Models’, World Economic Outlook, April 2019, Washington D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund.  
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Following a period of relative tranquillity through much of 2019, the VIX Volatility 
Index increased sharply in May. This measure of investor fear had been relatively 
low in the preceding months as investors had been optimistic about the prospect 
of the United States and China agreeing a bilateral trade deal. However, following 
the unexpected escalation in trade tensions between the two countries the Index 
spiked again in May. In light of these trade tensions and the general decline in 
optimism for the global economy, central banks remain accommodative with 
policy rates in the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, the Bank of England 
and the Bank of Japan unlikely to increase through the second half of the year. 
 
FIGURE 5 VIX VOLATILITY INDEX (%) 
 
 
Source:  St Louis Fed Database, from Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 
As the outlook for the Eurozone remains weak in the face of growing 
international instability, the ECB continues to provide a stimulus to the monetary 
union through its accommodative monetary policy stance. The Eonia rate, which 
is the rate at which banks can lend to each other overnight, stood at just above  
-0.4 per cent in May, which is in line with the negative policy rates set by the ECB. 
With the ECB signalling an intent to keep rates on hold until at least the middle of 
2020, this accommodative stance looks set to remain in place for the foreseeable 
future.  
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FIGURE 6 EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE, EONIA (%) 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Due to the low inflation environment that persisted over the last decade, the ECB 
and other central banks turned to unconventional monetary policy in order to 
provide monetary stimulus. This stimulus came in the form of Quantitative Easing 
(QE) whereby Central Banks purchased large amounts of sovereign and corporate 
debt in financial markets in order to increase the money supply, lower the cost of 
credit, increase liquidity and loosen the credit supply.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates the significant growth in assets on central bank balance sheets 
over the past decade. Following the initiation of QE by the Federal Reserve and 
then the BOE, the ECB introduced its own QE programme in 2015. Over the next 
three years the number of assets purchased by the ECB increased significantly, 
reaching a peak of value of nearly €4.7 trillion in January 2019. Having been 
credited with boosting economic growth and preventing deflation, the ECB 
announced in December 2018 that it would begin unwinding its asset purchase 
programme. However, with policy rates still negative and inflation still below the 
desired rate the ECB has hinted at a possible return of unconventional monetary 
policy should the need arise.  
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FIGURE 7 CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEETS ($MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of Japan. 
 
Accommodative monetary policy through low policy rates and QE has kept 
government bond yields low into 2019. Further downward pressure is also being 
exerted on sovereign yields as investor concerns about the near term prospects 
for the global economy grow, increasing the demand for developed country 
sovereign bonds which are generally considered to be safe assets. Ten-year 
government bond yields for a select group of advanced countries are presented 
in Figure 8. The ten-year yield for Ireland fell to 0.56 per cent in March, the 
lowest level since 2016. This is particularly beneficial due to the large level of 
outstanding debt currently being repaid by the Irish Exchequer. 
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FIGURE 8 TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  St. Louis Fed database. 
 
Figure 9 shows the level of credit loaned to the private non-financial sector 
(PNFS) for both emerging and advanced economies. While credit to the PNFS has 
remained relatively stable in advanced economies, there has been a significant 
increase in the level of borrowing in emerging economies following the financial 
crisis. Whereas credit to the PNFS in emerging economies was worth just 76 per 
cent of GDP in Q4 2008, as of Q1 2018 it has grown to over 144 per cent of GDP.  
 
Despite the fall in credit to emerging economies in Q3 and Q4 of 2018, the level 
of leverage remains high by historical standards. This increase in leverage comes 
during a period of persistently low interest rates in advanced economies with 
investors looking for greater yields elsewhere.6 One possible risk faced by 
corporations in emerging economies is the possibility of monetary policy 
normalisation in advanced economies, incentivising investors away from lending 
to corporations in emerging markets. A sudden withdrawal of credit would likely 
have a significant destabilising impact on the domestic markets of emerging 
economies with the potential for cross-border contagion effects. This in turn 
could negatively impact development and trade in these regions and potentially 
weaken the global outlook for trade even further. 
 
                                                          
 
6  See Bräuning, Falk and Victoria Ivashina (forthcoming). ‘US Monetary Policy and Emerging Market Credit Cycles’. 
Journal of Monetary Economics. 
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FIGURE 9 CREDIT TO PRIVATE NON-FINANCIAL SECTOR BY DEVELOPMENT CATEGORY  
 
 
Source:  Bank for International Settlements. 
Note:  Credit as a percentage of GDP featured on LHS and USD value ($ billion) on RHS. 
 
Figure 10 displays exchange rates of the Euro (EUR) to the US Dollar (USD), the 
British Pound Sterling (GBP), the Swiss Franc (CHF) and the Chinese Renminbi 
(CNY). These are the currencies of Ireland’s largest trading partners outside the 
Eurozone and their values against the EUR impact on the competitiveness of Irish 
companies in the international market. Since the onset of Brexit there has been a 
substantial strengthening of the EUR/GBP rate. On 24 June 2016, the day after 
the Brexit referendum, the EUR/GBP appreciated by over 6 per cent and by the 
end of the year was nearly 16 per cent higher than it had been 12 months earlier. 
As fears of a No-Deal Brexit temporarily subsided in Q2 2019, GBP has 
strengthened relative to EUR but remains significantly weaker than it was at the 
start of 2016.  
 
Meanwhile, the EUR/USD rate has been weakening since the first quarter of 
2018. This is likely due to strong growth in the US economy in comparison to the 
Euro Area over this period. With Euro Area interest rates set to remain constant, 
a rate hike by the Federal Reserve in 2019 would likely lead to further 
depreciation of the EUR/USD rate. Though the EUR/CNY rate had been trending 
downwards since Q3 2018 there was a sharp increase in the exchange rate in 
May. This was likely due to capital leaving China as investors fear the negative 
impact an escalated trade war with the US could have on the Chinese economy. 
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FIGURE 10 EUR EXCHANGE RATE TO USD, GBP, CHF (JANUARY 2016, BASE=100) 
 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Goods  
As with the observed slowdown in global trade activity, growth of Irish imports 
and exports weakened in Q1 2019. As displayed in Figure 11, seasonally-adjusted 
cross-border goods exports increased by 11.7 per cent in Q1 2019 relative to the 
same period last year. Much like the opening quarter of the previous year, 
imports changed modestly, increasing by 1 per cent year-on-year. This resulted in 
a net contribution to the overall trade balance of €3.7 billion, given that import 
growth has slowed far more sharply.  
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FIGURE 11 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN CROSS-BORDER IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Cross-border trade excludes the trade of ownership goods (e.g. contract 
manufacturing, merchanting)7 hence the final growth rates for Quarterly National 
Account goods trade will differ compared to these figures. While these traded 
goods are owned by Irish resident firms, some of these goods may never 
physically cross the Irish border nor are they produced domestically. Cross-border 
trade therefore functions somewhat more accurately as an indicator of domestic 
exporter performance.8 When examining the trade of goods, foreign-owned Irish 
resident firm activities such as processing and merchanting must be taken into 
account. 
 
The 11.7 per cent increase in cross-border exports was largely driven by chemical 
and machinery products, as displayed in Table 1. Of a €4.2 billion increase in 
exports, chemical products contributed €2.3 billion while machinery contributed 
€1.2 billion. Though Irish trade is highly influenced by the pharmaceutical 
industry, excluding chemical products still results in export growth of 15 per cent 
due to significant improvements in the exports of electricity, electrical machinery 
 
                                                          
 
7  ‘Goods for processing’ is dominated by ‘Contract Manufacturing’, a process in which multinational companies 
residing in Ireland issue contracts to foreign firms to produce goods. Although these goods never enter the Irish 
economy, due to ownership of these goods pertaining to Irish resident firms, sales are recorded as an Irish export.  
‘Merchanting’ consists of the buying and selling of completed goods abroad which at no stage enter or leave Ireland.  
8  For further details on ownership trade, see CSO document ‘Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016’. 
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and transport equipment.9 For the same period, trade in machinery and 
chemicals products represented 60 per cent of total imports. Machinery imports 
increased year-on-year by 8.8 per cent while imports of chemicals declined by 
23.6 per cent. The significant decline in chemicals is mostly attributed to reduced 
imports of medicinal and pharmaceutical products from Germany and Italy, down 
69 and 78 per cent respectively, relative to Q1 2018.  
 
TABLE 1 JANUARY-MARCH CHANGE IN IRISH EXPORTS BY COMMODITY (€ BILLION) 
 
Q1 2018 Q1 2019 €Change  % Change 
Cross Border Goods 33.8 38.0 4.2 12 
 Food and live animals 2.6 2.7 0.1 4 
 Beverages and tobacco 0.3 0.4 0.1 24 
 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0.5 0.5 0.0 -4 
 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0.2 0.5 0.3 135 
 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 -15 
 Chemicals and related products 21.4 23.8 2.3 11 
 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 0.6 0.6 0.0 2 
 Machinery and transport equipment 4.2 5.4 1.2 29 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3.8 4.0 0.1 3 
 Other items 0.2 0.3 0.1 30 
Exports less Chemical Products 12.4 14.3 1.8 15 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC author calculations. 
 
Given the vulnerability of the domestic agricultural sector to Brexit, it is 
important to monitor food exports closely. Figure 12 splits food trade into two 
major sub-components. In general, food exports have improved somewhat, 
largely driven by dairy products and eggs. The UK and EU were the main 
contributors to the 5.1 per cent growth in Irish food exports whereas the 
remainder of the world’s demand for Irish food exports continued to decline, 
down by 0.8 per cent in Q1 2019 relative to the same period last year. 
  
 
                                                          
 
9  Electricity is registered under ‘Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials’. With the launch of the Integrated 
Single Electricity Market (ISEM) in October 2018, exports and imports of electricity increased in Q1 2019, year-on-
year, by 709 and 751 per cent respectively. Though these gross flows are large, when combined they contribute 
towards a mild trade deficit in net exports of electricity.  
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FIGURE 12 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) OF CROSS-BORDER FOOD EXPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Services 
In 2018, service exports increased annually by 10 per cent. Computer services 
accounted for half of total service exports for the year, up from a share of 43 per 
cent in 2017. It is worth noting that exports of computer services have been 
experiencing consecutive quarters of double digit growth since mid-2014. As 
highlighted in Figure 13, business services have recently been exhibiting similar 
improvements. As stated by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in their recent data 
release, this is mainly observed through greater advertising and inter-affiliate 
management charges.  
 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Total Food Meat & Meat Prep Dairy & Eggs
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Summ er  20 19  |  1 7  
FIGURE 13 EXPORTS OF SERVICES BY COMPONENT (€MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Imports of services increased annually by 4 per cent. Royalties & licences and 
business services accounted for 78 per cent of service imports both in 2017 and 
2018. As a component of ‘business services’, imports of research and 
development services experienced the largest annual increase in Q4 2018, rising 
annually by 120 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 14 IMPORTS OF SERVICES BY COMPONENT (€MILLION) 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Current Account 
Similarly to the previous year, the low trade balance for services in 2018 resulted 
in a significant current account surplus of €29 billion (12 per cent of gross 
national product). As seen in Figure 15, this surplus could have been far larger, 
roughly 15 per cent of GNP, had recent developments in service trade stayed on 
course. A sudden increase in R&D related imports led to the relatively low current 
account contribution of €178 million in Q4 2018.  
 
FIGURE 15 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (€MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Given the influence that a small number of particularly large multinational firms 
have had on the current account from 2015 onwards, the Central Statistics Office 
proceeded to release a modified measure of the current account balance, with 
the aim of excluding transactions that were not reflective of the underlying 
conditions of the domestic economy and its relationship with the wider global 
markets. These adjustments include the exclusion of trade in R&D related 
intellectual property services and imports of aircraft related to leasing. 
Furthermore, to address distortions to primary income outflows, the modified 
balance also excludes the contribution of depreciation on R&D service imports 
and trade in IP, depreciation attributed to aircraft leasing and redomiciled 
income.  
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While these various changes reduce the current account balance, it is still positive 
from 2014 onward. From Figure 16 it can be seen that depreciation and service 
trade related to R&D activities has had the most distortionary impact on the 
current account balance, while aircraft leasing has played a relatively minor role 
since 2015. As seen in the figure, the Commentary forecasts a current account 
surplus of €29 billion in 2018.  
 
FIGURE 16 MODIFIED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (€MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Due to the volatile nature of ownership trade in goods as well as services, 
forecasts in the Commentary continue to be based on trends in trade patterns 
linked to underlying Irish economic activity. Given the persistent signs of 
slowdowns in bilateral trade flows across major economies and recent data on 
Irish trade performance in the initial quarter of 2019, underlying growth forecasts 
have been moderated slightly. We expect export growth of 4.2 per cent and 4.3 
per cent in 2019 and 2020 respectively. Imports are expected to increase by 6.0 
per cent in 2019 and 5.9 per cent the following year. The year-end current 
account is expected to reach €17.9 billion (6.8 per cent of GNP) in 2019 before 
falling somewhat to €14 billion (5.1 per cent of GNP) in 2020. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors and the outlook for inflation. This is followed by a 
review of demand-side factors such as consumption and housing market issues. 
On the supply side, we then examine developments in investment and the labour 
market before concluding with an analysis of the public finances. 
 
In Figure 17 the actual and forecast performance of the Irish economy is placed 
within a European context – the actual growth rate of the domestic economy in 
2015 of 25 per cent is replaced by an estimated growth rate of 5.5 per cent.10 
From 2014 onwards, the significant relative performance of the Irish economy is 
apparent. According to the most recent forecasts, this performance looks set to 
continue over the next two years. 
 
FIGURE 17 ACTUAL (2011-2018) AND FORECAST (2019-2020) ANNUAL GDP GROWTH RATES (%) 
 
 
Source:  St Louis Fed Database, from Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 
 
                                                          
 
10  Most commentators accept that the official 25 per cent growth rate in 2015 did not accurately reflect the rate of 
underlying growth in the Irish economy for that year. Following calculations in the Autumn 2016 Quarterly Economic 
Commentary (QEC), we estimate the rate of GDP growth at 5.5 per cent for 2015. 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
European Union Germany Ireland Spain France United Kingdom
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Summ er  20 19  |  2 1  
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL AND INFLATION OUTLOOK 
Household Credit and Mortgage Market  
Due to the potential financial instability risks that can emerge from high levels of 
credit in the economy, the growth rates of household lending must be monitored 
closely. Figure 18 presents the growth rates of credit to households from Irish 
resident credit institutions.11 The data are split by loans for house purchase and 
other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). The annual 
growth rate of mortgage lending was 1.4 per cent in Q4 2018 which was a slight 
increase on the 1 per cent growth rate in Q3 2018. There was also an expansion 
in the growth rate of non-mortgage credit, up to 2.7 per cent in Q4 2018. While 
the growth rates in lending for house purchase and other personal credit were 
positive in each quarter of 2018, they remain significantly below their pre-crisis 
peak level.  
 
FIGURE 18 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes: Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.   
 
Looking at new mortgage lending, in Q1 2019 the total volume of drawdowns 
increased by 8.9 per cent annually while the total value of drawdowns increased 
by 10.6 per cent. These are the lowest rates of new mortgage growth in both 
 
                                                          
 
11  See CBI, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics: Private Household Credit and Deposits A.18 for details. 
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volume and value terms since Q1 2016 when annual growth rates were negative. 
It is likely that the deceleration in the growth rate of new mortgages is related to 
affordability issues in the housing market with fewer people able to access the 
higher levels of credit required due to the persistent increase in house prices. 
However, it should be noted that despite the deceleration in growth rates the 
total amount of new mortgage drawdowns in Q1 2019 was still at its highest level 
in the first quarter of any year since 2009. 
 
FIGURE 19 TOTAL NEW MORTGAGE LENDING (%) 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
Trends in SME Credit Market 
The allocation of credit to SMEs provides a gauge of both the willingness of credit 
providers to take on risk and the views of indigenous businesses to the suitability 
of market conditions for future investment. Figure 20 presents new lending to 
SMEs over the period 2011 to 2018. From 2013 onwards it can be seen that the 
volume of new lending to SMEs has been increasing annually. However, the rate 
of growth has declined in 2017 and 2018 and now stands at just over 6 per cent 
which is the lowest rate of growth in SME lending since 2013. The slowdown in 
the rate of lending may be related to uncertainty among domestic businesses 
with regards to the outcome of Brexit as well as the reduced growth outlook 
across Europe. However, these data only include lending by the traditional 
banking sector. If it is the case that SMEs are using increasing amounts of non-
bank financing, the overall financing level may be higher than documented in the 
official statistics.  
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FIGURE 20 NEW LENDING TO SMES – TOTAL PER ANNUM 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
 
Examining SME lending by sector (Figure 21), there were significant increases in 
lending to both the construction and business services sector in 2018. However, 
in areas such as manufacturing and wholesale and retail there was a fall in new 
lending relative to the previous year. Wholesale and retail firms may be 
tempering investment due to declining consumer sentiment which is reflective of 
the growing uncertainty around Brexit. Investment may also be curtailed due to 
the growth of e-commerce, with consumers switching away from traditional retail 
and purchasing more goods online.  
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FIGURE 21 NEW LENDING TO SMES – BY SECTOR PER ANNUM (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1.  
 
Interest Rates and the Cost of Finance 
Since 2014, the interest rate on mortgages in Ireland has been falling steadily and 
as of March 2019 it stood at 2.98 per cent. Nevertheless, the borrowing rate on 
Irish loans remains the highest in the Euro Area, as has been the case since 
Q3 2014. As of March 2019, interest rates on mortgages were nearly 100 basis 
points higher than the Euro Area average. Given the affordability issues in the 
Irish housing market, the comparatively high borrowing rates exacerbate the 
challenges faced by Irish homeowners.  
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FIGURE 22 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS – EUROPEAN 
COMPARISON 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data differ 
between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the new 
business SVR is only for new drawdowns.  
 
Like interest rates on mortgages, rates on corporate loans in Ireland are also 
higher than the Eurozone average. Figure 23 presents the interest rates on new 
business loans for Non-Financial Corporations in Ireland as well as the mean rate 
for the Eurozone. Two series are shown: 1) covering all loans and 2) covering 
loans worth less than €250,000, the latter of which is used as a proxy for loans to 
SMEs. While the interest rate on all corporate loans in Ireland was 3.03 per cent 
in March 2019, the average rate in the Euro Area was just 1.64 per cent. The 
difference is even starker for small loans with the rate in Ireland 5.33 per cent 
compared to 2.25 per cent in the Eurozone. 
 
There are a number of factors in the Irish credit market that may be contributing 
to these interest rate differentials. One such factor which has been cited by the 
Central Bank12 among others is the lack of competition among retail banks. In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis a number of banks collapsed, increasing the 
concentration of retail banks in the Irish market. This has reduced the level of 
competition in the banking sector. More broadly, differences in firm behaviour, 
risk appetites and national regulation, particularly with regard to repossessions, 
 
                                                          
 
12  Nevin, Ciarán (2018). ‘Irish retail bank profitability 2003-2018’, Financial Stability Notes, Vol. 2018, No. 10, Central 
Bank of Ireland. 
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are amongst the main reasons for the difference in interest rates between the 
Irish and European markets. 
 
FIGURE 23 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS – EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
 
 
Sources:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans worth less than €250,000. 
 
Inflation Outlook 
Figure 24 presents the inflation rate in Ireland using CPI, the CPI excluding energy 
and unprocessed foods (core inflation), and HICP. All three measures of price 
growth have increased considerably throughout 2019. In May 2019, the  
12-month inflation rate was 1.0 per cent for CPI and HICP. With energy prices 
rising by 5 per cent, core inflation remains below headline CPI at 0.6 per cent. 
Other sectors in which there was an annual increase in prices were restaurants 
and hotels  
(+ 3.2 per cent), alcohol and tobacco (+ 2.7 per cent), and education costs  
(+ 1.7 per cent). Elsewhere, sectors which experienced deflation over the  
12-month period were furnishings, household equipment and routine household 
maintenance (-3.9 per cent), communications (-6.1 per cent), clothing and 
footwear (-1.3 per cent) and food and non-alcoholic beverages (-0.2 per cent).  
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FIGURE 24 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 25 highlights a noticeable difference in the price trends between goods 
and services. While the annual price growth of services reached 1.2 per cent in 
May, the prices of goods fell by 0.2 per cent over the same period. Though the 
rate of deflation for goods has been slowing since the start of the year, negative 
or low price growth for goods has been persistent since 2013. 
 
FIGURE 25 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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In light of the Commentary’s forecast for strong domestic demand and further 
tightening in the labour market, price growth is expected to accelerate over the 
next two years. Consumer prices are expected to increase by 1.4 per cent in 2019, 
rising to 1.7 per cent in 2020.  
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
According to the latest quarterly National Accounts, personal consumption 
expenditure increased by 2.6 per cent year-on-year in Q4 2018. The continued 
strong growth in household spending has likely been driven by lower 
unemployment rates and increasing disposable incomes. However, despite this, 
the past two quarters have shown a moderation in the rate of growth. Given the 
international uncertainties around Brexit, tariff and trade policy, it would not be 
surprising if households were lowering consumption levels to build up savings 
buffers in case adverse scenarios materialise. Nevertheless, the fast pace of 
domestic economic expansion, coupled with the tightness in the labour market 
may outweigh or offset these factors as household resources increase. 
Understanding which of these factors will dominate is critical to charting the path 
for consumption over the coming period.  
 
FIGURE 26  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
To get an insight into what is driving household spending patterns we draw on 
detailed retail sales data. Retail sales is an important input into understanding 
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household behaviour as it measures actual spending and is available in a timely 
manner. Table 2 presents the annual growth in retail sales volume for select 
items for the three months to April 2019. Across all sectors, retail sales are up on 
the same three months in the previous year. Overall retail business increased by 
4.5 per cent or 6.3 per cent when sales of motor vehicles were excluded. Sales of 
furniture and lighting goods were considerable, up 12.4 per cent, which is likely 
due to the strong growth in housing market activity. Since the last Commentary, 
which considered data up to end 2018, there has been a pick-up in retail sales 
with the annualised growth rates accelerating. This is likely due to the strong 
improvement in the labour market (in terms of employment and wage growth) 
observed during this period.  
 
TABLE 2 GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (THREE MONTHS TO APRIL 2019) 
Retail Business – NACE Rev. 2  
Volume of Sales 
Annual % change 
Motor Trades 0.9 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores) 5.1 
Department stores 1.7 
Clothing, Footwear and Textiles 9.2 
Furniture and lighting 15.2 
All retail businesses 4.5 
All retail businesses, excluding motor trades 6.3 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The overall trends in retail sales are displayed in Figure 27. This chart presents a 
three-month rolling average of annual growth of total retail sales, sales excluding 
the motor trade, and sales for household equipment. Retail sales (both including 
and excluding motor sales) continue to perform strongly. The growth in 
household equipment sales remains well above the average of all retail sales, 
with the three-month rolling rate up 17.9 per cent in April 2019. As previously 
noted, this is likely driven by the continued increase in housing market activity. 
Given the uncertainties facing consumers in the Irish economy, in particular with 
Brexit, it may have been expected that retail sales growth would have moderated 
through late 2018 and into 2019. While this does appear to have happened up to 
February 2019, the March and April updates suggest a pick-up in retail sales and a 
further acceleration in the growth rate. This may be driven by improvements in 
the labour market outweighing any concerns due to uncertainty or some pent up 
demand being released with the announcement of the delay in Brexit. 
 
30 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Sum me r 2 01 9   
FIGURE 27 ANNUAL GROWTH (%) IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005=100), 
THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Another important indicator which provides insight into household spending is 
consumer sentiment. Figure 28 presents an index developed using the European 
Commission data on consumer sentiment. The figure presents data for Ireland, 
the UK and the rest of the EU to provide context.  
 
FIGURE 28 CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS – IRELAND, UK AND REST OF EU 
 
Source:  European Commission data and ESRI calculation.  
Note:  The positive/negative balances from the EU confidence series are transformed by adding 100. We then set the base to 100 in 
January 2010 with growth relative to this point i.e. ((Yt/YJan2010) -1)*100. 
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While consumer sentiment grew much more strongly in Ireland than elsewhere in 
the period 2014-2017, it is clear that mid- to late-2018 consumer sentiment has 
been falling. This suggests that Irish consumers became more fearful as the Brexit 
deadline drew to a close without a deal. A similar pattern is also evident in the 
UK. The most recent data point for May 2019 provides some respite with a pick-
up in sentiment occurring in Ireland, the UK and EU. This may be driven by the 
postponement of the Brexit deadline to October 2019 giving time for negotiations 
to continue.  
 
FIGURE 29  SCATTER PLOT OF RETAIL SALES AND CONSUMER SENTIMENT 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis.  
Note:  Trendline is a cubic polynomial.   
 
The fact that retail sales are continuing to rise into 2019 despite the moderation 
in consumer sentiment makes charting the path for consumption more difficult. 
Both of these indicators normally move in tandem (See Figure 29). However this 
relationship appears to have broken down coming into late 2018, as displayed in 
Figure 29 where the past nine months have shown a negative correlation 
between sentiment and retail sales. Box 1 by McQuinn provides evidence to 
suggest that actual consumer sentiment levels has departed from that level 
suggested by economic fundamentals such as unemployment and inflation. Part 
of this can be explained by looking at the subcomponents of consumer sentiment 
in Figure 30. It can be seen that households have become much more pessimistic 
regarding their views on the broader economy but are more positive about their 
own finances and spending plans. This likely explains why we see a continued 
pick-up in retail sales despite a moderation in consumer sentiment.  
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FIGURE 30  RELATIVE TRENDS IN CONSUMER SENTIMENT SUB-INDICES 
 
Source:  European Commission data and ESRI calculation.  
Note:  The positive/negative balances from the EU confidence series are transformed by adding 100. We then set the base to 100 
in January 2010 with growth relative to this point i.e. ((Yt/YJan2010) -1)*100. 
 
Looking forward, and considering both factors, we expect household 
consumption to continue growing positively over the next two years. Given the 
expected increase in employment and the continued increase in earnings, this 
should support higher consumer spending. The current data suggest these factors 
are outweighing any decline in consumer sentiment driven by the uncertain 
outlook. In 2019 we expect consumption expenditure to grow by 2.5 per cent and 
at a slightly slower pace of 2.3 per cent in 2020.  
 
BOX 1  MODELLING IRISH CONSUMER SENTIMENT – THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BREXIT 
There is general agreement that Brexit constitutes one of the greatest challenges to the 
Irish economy over the short to medium term with a range of studies highlighting the 
adverse impact of the UK’s departure from the European Union (EU) on headline Irish 
economic variables. However, has Brexit already had a negative impact ex ante on Irish 
economic performance? From October 2018 onwards Irish consumer sentiment as 
captured by the Consumer Sentiment Index estimated by the ESRI and KBC Bank has 
shown a sharp downturn. This is despite the fact that most key Irish economic variables 
such as labour market data and taxation receipts have shown robust growth over the 
period. However, since this period there has been a significant increase in the amount of 
media attention devoted to Brexit with political developments in the UK particularly 
receiving heightened levels of coverage in Ireland. Therefore, in this box, we attempt to 
see if there is evidence to suggest that Brexit is adversely impacting Irish consumer 
sentiment. Figure A plots Irish consumer sentiment as per the KBC/ESRI index. From this, 
the deterioration in sentiment since Q4 2018 can be observed. 
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To gauge the potential impact of Brexit on consumer sentiment, we specify and estimate 
a model of Irish consumer sentiment. If, using standard determinants of consumer 
sentiment, the model is unable to explain recent trends in consumer sentiment, this 
could provide a priori evidence that Brexit maybe impacting Irish consumer attitudes. 
In general, there is a relative dearth of such models, however, one exception is that 
specified in Lovell and Tien (2000). In modelling US consumer sentiment, Lovell and Tien 
(2000) specifically assess the value of an Economic Discomfort Index (EDI) as devised by 
the noted economist Arthur Okun. The index consists of the following. 
     EDI = |?̇?𝑡| + 𝑢𝑡       (1) 
where |?̇?𝑡| is the absolute rate of inflation and 𝑢𝑡 is the unemployment rate. The Wall 
Street Journal (1971) summarised the index in the following way.  
The higher this index, the greater the discomfort – we’re less pained by 
inflation if the job market is jumping, and less sensitive to others’ 
unemployment if a placed price level is widely enjoyed .... 
Based on their model, Lovell and Tien (2000) state that, in a US context, the Economic 
Discomfort Index provides a reasonable first approximation in summarising the impact of 
adverse economic conditions on the consumer. 
Therefore, we now apply the index in assessing Irish consumer sentiment. The following 
model is specified and estimated: 
    log(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1log(𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑡)      (2) 
CPI is the Irish Consumer Sentiment Index. 
The model is run on monthly data over the period January 1998 to February 2019. The 
regression results are summarised in Table A. Over the period in question, the EDI 
variable is significant and has the correctly hypothesised sign.  
In Figure B, the residuals between the actual and fitted values from (2) models are 
plotted. It can be clearly observed that from 2018 onwards the model does a relatively 
poor job of estimating Irish consumer sentiment. Based on the EDI and its components, 
Irish consumer sentiment should have continued to trend upwards from October 2018, 
however, instead it has declined sharply. This suggests that some other variable or factor 
is influencing Irish consumer sentiment from this time. This provides evidence a priori to 
suggest that Brexit has had an adverse impact on Irish consumer sentiment. 
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A number of studies point to the close relationship between consumer sentiment and 
consumption. Carroll, Fuhrer and Wilcox (1994) and Ludvigson (2004) find that after 
controlling for economic fundamentals – measured by labour income growth, stock 
prices and short-term interest rates – sentiment contains some small but statistically 
significant independent information about future consumption growth. Using Australian 
data, Gillitzer and Prasad (2016) argue that changes in consumer sentiment have a direct 
effect on consumption. Therefore, if Brexit has had an adverse impact on consumer 
sentiment, it has already had a materially negative impact on the Irish economy via lower 
rates of consumption than would otherwise be the case.  
TABLE A  REGRESSION ESTIMATE RESULTS 
Dependent Variable log(𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒕) 
 Coefficient T-Stat 
 log(𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑡) -0.615 -14.42 
  𝑅2 = 0.452 
 
Source:  QEC Authors’ Analysis. 
 
FIGURE A  IRISH CONSUMER SENTIMENT 
 
Source:  KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Summ er  20 19  |  3 5  
 
FIGURE B  MODEL OF IRISH CONSUMER SENTIMENT: RESIDUAL VALUES 
 
Sources:  KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index and QEC Authors’ Analysis. 
 
References: 
Carroll C.D., J.C. Fuhrer and D.W. Wilcox (1994). ‘Does consumer sentiment forecast 
household spending? If so, why?’, The American Economic Review, 84(5), pp. 1397-1408. 
Gillitzer C. and N. Prasad (2016). ‘The effect of consumer sentiment on consumption’, 
Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper, RDP 2016-10. 
Lovell M.C. and P. Tien (2000). ‘Economic discomfort and consumer sentiment’, Eastern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 1-11. 
Ludvigson S.C. (2004). ‘Consumer confidence and consumer spending’, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 18(2), pp. 29-50. 
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Property market developments 
Property price growth has continued to decelerate into 2019, following the trend 
which began in mid-2018. The rate of growth is currently at its lowest rate since 
late 2013. Figure 31 plots the year-on-year changes in residential property prices 
by property type. 
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FIGURE 31 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH (%) BY DWELLING 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Since April 2018 annual property price growth has fallen month-on-month and, as 
of April 2019, the growth rate was just 3.1 per cent. This is a considerable decline 
from the growth rate seen in the same period the previous year. There is a range 
of factors which could potentially be contributing to these trends. One possible 
factor is the increased level of housing completions. However, a major potential 
contributory factor is the increasing extent to which borrowers are limited under 
the macroprudential rules on loan-to-income and loan-to-value. These measures 
are designed to ensure prudent borrowing levels are maintained in the residential 
sector. Across different types of dwelling, the divergence in growth rates 
between house prices and apartments has again narrowed into 2019.  
 
Property price developments for Dublin and the rest of Ireland are presented in 
Figure 32. The deceleration of property prices is most prevalent in Dublin where 
year-on-year property price growth fell to 0.5 per cent in April 2019, the lowest 
growth rate in the capital since 2013. On a more granular basis, prices were 
unchanged on an annualised basis for Dublin houses, with prices actually falling in 
three of the four local authority areas (Fingal, Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown and 
Dublin City) in April 2019 relative to April 2018. These figures are presented in 
Table 3.  
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TABLE 3 PERCENTAGE CHANGE OVER 12 MONTHS FOR RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE INDEX (%) 
BY TYPE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY AND MONTH 
  2018 M12 2019 M01 2019 M02 2019 M03 2019 M04 
Dublin – all residential properties 3.8 2.7 1.4 0.9 0.5 
Dublin – houses 4.1 2.8 1.3 0.5 0 
Dublin – apartments 3.4 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Dublin City – houses 4.0 3.1 1.7 0.4 -0.3 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown – houses 5.1 3.6 1.5 0.3 -1.5 
Fingal – houses 3.4 2.2 1.2 0.3 -0.4 
South Dublin – houses 4.5 3.4 3.2 3.5 4.0 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Given the marked deceleration in property price growth, down by over  
ten percentage points since April 2018, and the fact that prices are falling in three 
Dublin areas for house dwellings, it would not be surprising if Dublin overall 
experiences a reversal in property prices in the near term. Given the higher level 
of house prices in Dublin and the surrounding area, it is likely the Central Bank 
rules are binding most in these areas and this is contributing to the more marked 
decline in the growth rate observed in the capital area. Furthermore, housing 
supply has been concentrated in the Dublin area which may be helping to 
moderate prices.  
 
Property price growth in the rest of the country fell at a slower pace over the 
second half of 2018 and this has continued into 2019. As of April 2019, the year-
on-year growth was 5.6 per cent, down eight percentage points since April 2018. 
 
FIGURE 32 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH (%) BY REGION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
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While property price growth has clearly moderated, rent levels continue to rise 
across the country. In Q4 2018, the National Rent Index grew by just under 7 per 
cent relative to the same period in the previous year. As well as the national 
index, the ESRI/RTB Rental Index also produces indicators at a regional level, 
namely for Dublin, the Greater Dublin Area (GDA) and outside of the GDA. The 
indices are presented in Figure 33. Annual rent rates in Dublin grew by 7.8 per 
cent in Q4 2018, a higher rate than the other regional areas. Rents in the GDA 
and outside the GDA both grew at around 5.5 per cent. Increases in the rent level 
across the country are expected to continue as the level of housing supply fails to 
meet the country’s structural demand.  
 
FIGURE 33 RTB RENT INDEX – NATIONAL, DUBLIN, GDA (EXCL. DUBLIN) AND OUTSIDE GDA  
Q3 2007=100  
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
 
SUPPLY 
Investment 
Strong investment growth in Ireland over the past number of years has been a 
hallmark of the economic recovery. Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation has 
grown sharply with significant contributions from construction activity and 
multinational capital investment (even excluding investment in aircraft related to 
leasing and intangible assets from research and development activities). 
However, in recent quarters there has been a downward trend in investment 
growth, as displayed in Figure 34. While there are a number of potential factors 
behind this, it is likely that the current level of global uncertainty due to both 
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Brexit and international trade relations, are having a particularly adverse impact 
on the investment decisions of Irish firms. 
 
FIGURE 34  GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION GROWTH, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC Authors’ analysis.  
 
To provide further insight into the factors determining the slowdown in 
investment growth in Ireland, we split overall investment into its subcomponents 
and plot the trend in these series. Figure 35 presents trends in intangibles, 
buildings and construction, and machinery and equipment investment on a four-
quarter rolling average basis. While a slowdown in intangibles is evident, more 
notable for the underlying economy is a slowing trend in construction and 
machinery and equipment investment. 
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FIGURE 35  GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION GROWTH BY ASSET TYPE, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of Central Statistics Office data. 
 
In terms of the machinery and equipment, as this investment is dominated by 
multinationals it is likely to be considerably affected by global factors and global 
uncertainty. Box 2 examines the association between global uncertainty and Irish 
investment, noting that this relationship differs between asset classes and is 
strongest in the machinery and equipment category. The heightened sensitivity of 
Irish investment aggregates to global developments again reinforces the 
sensitivity of domestic economic activity to international trends. Indeed, the Box 
demonstrates that Irish investment is more sensitive to global, rather than Irish, 
uncertainty. 
 
BOX 2  GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY AND THE IMPACT ON IRISH AGGREGATE INVESTMENT 
 
It is well established that economic uncertainty has a negative effect on business 
investment. If political or economic risks rise, this increases the risk premium required by 
a firm and makes forecasting cash flow from fixed investment more difficult, especially 
given capital investment is often irreversible in nature. As a result, companies often 
postpone, forego or delay investment in periods of economic, financial or political 
instability. From an academic standpoint, there is a long literature which explores the link 
between uncertainty and investment with estimates of the causal effect coming through 
as unambiguously negative. Furthermore, recent research has found a negative 
relationship between policy uncertainty and capital spending with differences evident 
across companies and asset types (Gulen and Ion, 2016).  
For a small open economy like Ireland, it is likely both domestic and international 
uncertainty play varying roles depending on whether the firm is domestic facing or 
internationalised. Indeed, from a macroeconomic perspective, the impact of  
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multinationals on our capital investment statistics means that it is likely fluctuations in 
aggregate Irish investment may be more sensitive to global variables than their domestic 
counterparts. 
At present, there are some major sources of uncertainty in the Irish and global 
economies, the most important of these being Brexit and the ongoing trade policy 
dispute between the United States and China. This can be demonstrated by drawing on 
the US Economic Policy Uncertainty Index which is produced by Baker et al. (2016). The 
economic policy uncertainty indicator is calculated by counting the usage of key phrases 
from media reports to create a metric measuring the degree of suggested uncertainty. 
These data show a gradual pick-up in uncertainty through 2018 and into 2019. If that is 
contrasted with the same index for Ireland produced by Zalla (2017) using the same 
methodology, it can be seen that this index increased considerably since Brexit and has 
remained high despite a slight downturn in the most recent period. 
FIGURE C  ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY – BASED ON MEDIA MENTIONS OF KEY PHRASES 
 
Sources:  Baker et al. (2016). 
For the purposes of this Box, our objective is to explore whether Irish investment 
aggregates are more or less sensitive to Irish or international uncertainty (US). This, in 
turn, will help identify which factors are more useful as leading indicators of how trends 
in domestic investment are evolving. This can be useful for short-term commentators on 
the Irish economy when trying to react to increases in uncertainty before National 
Account data are available. 
To explore this in more detail, we take each of the constant price investment series from 
the CSO (modified versions), and estimate simple accelerator models of the type used in 
the ESRI macroeconomic model COSMO which link investment to output growth, the cost 
of capital and other factors in an error correction framework. This takes the following 
specification: 
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∆𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜎(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑡−1 −  𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 −  𝜐𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑡−1) 
The first part of this equation provides the short-term dynamics while the second part is 
the long-run equation. This is estimated with dynamic OLS. We augment the model by 
first adding the measure of Irish economic policy uncertainty from Figure C and secondly 
the measure of US policy uncertainty above to see how sensitive Irish investment 
aggregates are to each of these factors.  
The sample runs from Q1 1996 to Q4 2018. We estimate the model on four investment 
series: overall Gross Fixed Capital Formation; construction investment; machinery and 
equipment investment; and intangibles. Table B presents the coefficients from the long-
run and the short-run equations. For brevity, we present only the coefficients on the 
policy uncertainty indices.  
TABLE B  MODELS INCLUDING US AND IRISH ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
Long-Run Equations 
 Overall Construction M&E Intangibles 
ln(𝐸𝑃𝑈(𝑈𝑆)𝑡) 
-0.406*** -0.408*** -0.502*** -0.156+ 
(0.054) (0.063) (0.113) (0.081) 
ln(𝐸𝑃𝑈(𝐼𝐸)𝑡) 
-0.201* -0.163 -0.304*** -0.127 
(0.081) (0.107) (0.076) (0.060) 
Short-Run Equations 
Δln(𝐸𝑃𝑈(𝑈𝑆)𝑡−1) 
-0.271*** -0.170** -0.482*** -0.091 
(0.047) (0.055) (0.080) (0.090) 
Δln(𝐸𝑃𝑈(𝐼𝐸)𝑡−1) 
-0.026 0.010 -0.107 -0.021 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.067) (0.069) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 
 
Source: QEC Authors’ Analysis. 
Note:  US and Irish models ran separately, + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001. 
It is clear that US economic policy uncertainty has a significant and negative impact on 
Irish macroeconomic investment in both the short term and the long term. The long-term 
coefficient would suggest that a one percentage point increase in uncertainty lowers 
investment by -0.4 percentage points. This holds for all investment types but it is 
noteworthy that machinery and equipment investment is most sensitive to US 
uncertainty. This may be a factor in the short-term slowdown in Irish investment that we 
have seen in this asset type recently. Intangibles are less affected and this may be due to 
the fact that intangibles are not irreversible in terms of their investment nature. In terms 
of the short-term effects, changes in policy uncertainty slow the growth rate of 
investment in the short term and this is strongest for machinery and equipment assets. 
In contrast, the impact of Irish economic policy uncertainty is much more muted with the 
overall long-term effect half the size in magnitude (-0.201). It is also lower across all asset 
types. We do not find any short-term correlation between the investment series and 
domestic policy uncertainty. 
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In conclusion, this short box highlights the sensitivity of Irish investment to international 
uncertainty and how this is a critical indicator in understanding the path of investment 
over time. It also highlights the differing sensitivity across asset classes which is also 
important. Aggregate investment, due to the strong influence of international 
companies, is less sensitive to domestic policy uncertainty. 
References: 
Baker, S., N. Bloom and S. Davis (2016). ‘Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty’, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 131(4), pp. 1593-1636. 
Gulen, H. and M. Ion (2016). ‘Editor’s Choice Policy Uncertainty and Corporate 
Investment’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 29(3), pp. 523-564. 
Zalla, R. (2017). ‘Economic Policy Uncertainty in Ireland’, Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 
45(2), pp. 269-271. 
 
This Box was prepared by Conor O’Toole. 
 
Construction outlook 
Construction sector investment has grown strongly in recent years with growth 
rates of over 20 per cent per annum through 2016 and into 2017. However, more 
recently the growth rate has moderated, as noted above. Notwithstanding, the 
recent slowdown, such rapid rates of growth are high in an international context. 
To provide more insight as to the comparative dynamics of domestic capital 
formation in construction, Figure 36 presents the growth rate of Irish 
construction investment as compared to selected other European economies and 
the aggregate for the European Union as a whole. Irish construction investment is 
growing much more rapidly than any other country. It is also noteworthy that the 
Irish figures are historically much more volatile than in other countries.  
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FIGURE 36 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN GROSS TOTAL CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT – EUROPEAN 
COMPARISON (%) 
 
Source:  Eurostat and ESRI analysis. Data are chain linked volumes € million (2010) seasonally adjusted and calendar adjusted.  
 
In previous Commentaries, we have noted that the composition of Irish 
construction investment has changed since before the financial crisis with a much 
greater share of non-residential investment activity. This can be demonstrated in 
Figure 37 which shows the share of non-residential dwelling investment went 
from under 40 per cent of the total Irish investment level to just under 70 per 
cent at present. Across Europe, Ireland now has the highest share of investment 
accounted for by non-residential construction which mainly captures commercial 
real estate investment. Such a heightened contribution of this source of 
investment to the aggregate poses risks to Ireland if such investment is 
internationally financed and could suffer a quick reversal in prices and activity if 
global market conditions deteriorate. As most of the commercial real estate in 
Ireland is financed by international equity capital (Kennedy, 2017),13 the domestic 
banking stability risks are lessened. However they are not eliminated, as a 
reversal in prices and activity would affect market liquidity which would 
inevitably have a knock on effect for the domestic economy.  
 
                                                          
 
13  Kennedy, G. (2017). Property Market Overview’, Presentation to Central Bank of Ireland Property Market 
Roundtable, slides at: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/tns/events/171002-property-market-
presentation.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
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FIGURE 37 SHARE OF OTHER CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT TO TOTAL CONSTRUCTION – 
EUROPEAN COMPARISON (%) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat and ESRI analysis. Data are chain linked volumes € million (2010) seasonally adjusted and calendar adjusted. 
 
Given this heightened non-residential activity, we explore whether the observed 
slowdown is occurring in the commercial or residential investment activity. The 
annual growth rate of these two asset types is presented in Figure 38. We also 
present comparable growth rates for the European Union for context. It is 
noteworthy that the drop in the growth in construction activity is consistent for 
both dwellings and non-dwellings investment. The growth in dwellings 
investment in the EU has also slowed recently. 
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FIGURE 38 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN DWELLINGS VERSUS OTHER CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT 
– EUROPEAN COMPARISON (%) 
 
Source:  Eurostat and ESRI analysis. Data are chain linked volumes € million (2010) seasonally adjusted and calendar adjusted. 
 
Despite the slowdown in the growth rate in aggregate terms discussed above, we 
continue to expect that construction activity will increase, particularly as the 
completion of new residential units expands. Given the strong increase in housing 
completions from 14,400 in 2017 to 18,000 in 2018, we expect continued growth 
in 2019 and 2020. Both the increased private sector output and the expanded 
commitment by Government to increase the capital spend in housing (particularly 
related to the delivery of social and affordable units) in Budget 2019 are likely to 
be key factors in output increasing in the sector. Consequently, we forecast 
23,500 units in 2019 increasing to 29,000 units in 2020 (Figure 39).  
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FIGURE 39 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2019-2020 FORECASTS) – TO 2018 ACTUAL 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC forecasts.  
 
Forecasts 
As global risk factors and the Brexit negotiations continue to weigh on business 
planning, we have moderated our investment outlook for 2019 and 2020. 
However, strong construction activity and increased public investment are likely 
to be key drivers of domestic capital formation, despite the recent noted 
slowdown. Overall, we expect annual average growth in investment of 7.1 per 
cent in 2019 and 7.6 per cent in 2020. This is a minor downward revision relative 
to our previous Commentary and, if global conditions continue to deteriorate and 
a hard Brexit materialises, we would expect to revise our forecasts further 
downward as 2019 progresses.  
 
LABOUR MARKET 
Following a year of declines in the unemployment rate and record high levels of 
employment, there were no signs of a slowdown in the labour market in Q1 2019. 
Indeed, improvements in the labour market have accelerated in 2019 with 
unemployment falling to levels not seen since the years before the financial crisis. 
However, the strength of the labour market is likely to bring its own challenges 
for the Irish economy. As the economy approaches full employment, wage 
growth is likely to accelerate, posing a threat to the competiveness of Irish firms. 
Inflation pressures will also increase due to the greater levels of disposable 
income among consumers.  
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Unemployment 
While the Live Register is not a precise measure of unemployment,14 as it includes 
part-time and some seasonal and casual workers, it is one of the most up-to-date 
and detailed labour market measures. As of April 2019 there were 194,700 
people on the Live Register which was 33,600 (14.7 per cent) fewer than the 
same period the previous year. As can be seen from Figure 40, there was a fall in 
the total number of people under the age of 25 on the Live Register, declining by 
4,400 or 17.7 per cent over the year. 
 
FIGURE 40 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: OCTOBER 2006 TO OCTOBER 2018 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
As well as displaying the fall in the number of people out of work, data from the 
Live Register also indicate there has been a decrease in the duration of time 
people have been out of work. Long-term unemployment is defined as being out 
of work for a period of greater than 12 months and its negative consequences for 
individuals and society have been well documented.15 The longer a person is 
unemployed, the more difficult they are likely to find it to return to the workforce 
as a result of deskilling, reduced motivation and apprehension from employers 
about hiring someone who has been out of work for a sustained period of time. 
 
                                                          
 
14  The Live Register provides a monthly series of the numbers of people registered for Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseekers 
Allowance or other statutory entitlements at the Irish Department of Social Protection. 
15  Abraham, Catharine G., Kristin Sandusky, John Haltiwanger and James R. Spletzer (2016). ‘The Consequences of Long 
Term Unemployment: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data,’ Working Papers 16-40, Center for 
Economic Studies, US Census Bureau.   
O’Connell, P.J., S. McGuinness and Elish Kelly (2010). ‘A Statistical Profiling Model of Long-Term Unemployment Risk 
in Ireland’. Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Papers. 
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Figure 41 shows the share of registrations by duration in April 2014 and five years 
later in April 2019. Over this time there was a 7 per cent reduction in those who 
were registered for a period of greater than a year i.e. classified as long-term 
unemployed. Coupled with the overall decline in the number of people on the 
Live Register, the number of people in long-term unemployment fell by 103,000 
down to 75,000 over this period. There was also a 4 per cent decrease in the 
proportion of people in very long-term unemployment (on the register for three 
years or more) over this period, down to 42,000.  
 
FIGURE 41 PROPORTION OF PEOPLE ON THE LIVE REGISTER (%) BY DURATION 
 
 
Sources:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Q1 2019 has seen a sharp decline in the rate of unemployment, falling below  
5 per cent for the first time since August 2007. This marks a significant milestone 
in the turnaround of the Irish labour market where just over seven years previous 
the unemployment rate peaked at around 16 per cent. As of May 2019 the 
seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate was 4.4 per cent which is the lowest it 
has been since January 2005. Despite the slowdown in growth in the Eurozone 
and the uncertainty which has persisted around Brexit, the labour market has 
continued to expand and is now approaching a level which can be considered full 
employment.  
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FIGURE 42 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
A labour market approaching full employment has a number of implications for 
the Irish economy with regard to competitiveness and increasing price levels. 
Figure 43 shows a scatter plot of core inflation and unemployment in Ireland with 
monthly data points from January 1998 to April 2014. A clear inverse relationship 
akin to the short-run Philips Curve emerges where, as unemployment falls, there 
is an increase in the rate of inflation. The quadratic trend line in Figure 43 
highlights the non-linear relationship between the two variables. Of particular 
relevance to the current labour market situation is that as the unemployment 
rate approaches 4 per cent there has historically been a steep incline in inflation 
in the range of 5 to 6 per cent. Given that the current unemployment rate is at 
4.4 per cent and trending sharply downwards, this relationship suggests we are 
likely to see increasing upward pressure on price levels through 2019. 
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FIGURE 43 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND CORE INFLATION (JAN 1998 TO  
APR 2019) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Employment  
Following a year in which Irish employment levels reached record highs, there 
were no signs of a slowdown in job creation over Q1 2019. On a seasonally-
adjusted basis, there were 81,200 additional jobs added to the Irish economy in 
Q1 2019 compared to the same period the previous year, representing an 
increase of 3.7 per cent. This brings the total number of people in employment up 
to 2,301,900. The number of people working full time increased by 3.5 per cent 
up to 1,828,900 while part-time employment increased by 4.1 per cent to 
473,000. The number of people who are part-time underemployed, which is a 
measure of those who are currently working part time but would like more hours, 
fell by 6 per cent. This suggests that there are an increasing number of people 
moving from part-time to full-time work in the Irish labour force. Over the same 
period the labour force participation rate for those aged 15-64 increased slightly 
to 72.8 per cent.  
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FIGURE 44  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT, FULL TIME AND PART TIME (‘000) 
 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office 
 
Figure 45 breaks down the seasonally-adjusted level of employment by sector for 
the first quarter of 2014, 2018 and 2019. The construction sector has had by far 
the largest growth in employment, increasing by 66.1 per cent over the last five 
years. This is due to both the low base level of employment in the sector 
following the housing collapse and the subsequent rapid recovery in the property 
market in recent years. There have also been significant increases in employment 
in the admin and support services sector (+40.1 per cent), the transportation and 
storage sector (+24.4 per cent) and the accommodation and food service sector 
(23.6 per cent). The only sector in which there has been a fall in employment has 
been in agriculture (including forestry and fishing) where employment fell by 6.3 
per cent compared to 2014 and 8.6 per cent compared to 2018. In light of the 
tightening labour market, it is notable that the biggest sectoral growth is 
concentrated in domestic non-traded sectors. If these areas divert considerable 
resources away from the traded sector, and prices and wages in these sectors 
continue to rise, this is highly likely to lead to an erosion in competitiveness and a 
further challenge to firms’ in traded sectors. 
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FIGURE 45  ANNUAL GROWTH SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR (‘000) 
 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Table 4 presents employment rates by gender and education for Q1 2014 and  
Q1 2019. The strengthening of the labour market over this period is reflected in 
the increase in the overall employment rate of 7.3 per cent. While employment 
rates for both men and women have increased over the period, the gender gap 
has remained unchanged at about 10 percentage points. The gender gap is most 
pronounced among those with lower levels of education and converges for those 
with higher levels of education. In terms of educational attainment, the group 
which has seen the smallest improvement in employment rates over this period 
has been those with an education level of lower secondary or below. This is 
especially concerning given the already low rate of employment among this 
group in 2014. Indeed, in Ireland the rate of employment among those with lower 
levels of education consistently falls below the average rate in both the EU and 
OECD.16  
 
 
                                                          
 
16  The rate of employment for 20-64 year olds with educational attainment of lower secondary or below was 51.5 per 
cent in Ireland in 2018 compared to 56.1 per cent in the EU.  
 The rate of employment for 25-64 year olds with educational attainment of lower secondary or below was 50.85 per 
cent in Ireland in 2017 compared to 57.4 per cent in the OECD.  
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TABLE 4  EMPLOYMENT RATES BY GENDER AND EDUCATION (AGE 15-64) (%) 
Gender Education 
Q1 2014 
% 
Q1 2019 
% 
Both sexes 
All Education levels 62.0 69.3 
Lower secondary or below 38.8 42.4 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 61.5 70.2 
Tertiary 80.0 85.2 
Male 
All Education levels 67.0 74.3 
Lower secondary or below 48.3 50.7 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 68.0 77.7 
Tertiary 84.7 89.9 
Female 
All Education levels 57.1 64.3 
Lower secondary or below 27.0 32.0 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 54.8 62.4 
Tertiary 76.3 81.4 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Earnings 
Seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings increased by 2.23 per cent in  
Q1 2019 compared to the same period the previous year. The average earnings 
per hour now stands at €23.38 while the average earnings per week is €761.63. In 
terms of sectors the largest increases were observed in transportation and 
storage up by €1.68 per hour (+7.8 per cent), arts and entertainment up by €1.30 
per hour (+7.3 per cent) and mining and quarrying up by €1.66 per hour (+7.2 per 
cent). Other notable increases occurred in wholesale and retail (+4 per cent), 
information and communication (+3.9 per cent) and administrative and support 
services (+3 per cent). In a number of sectors there was a fall in the seasonally-
adjusted Average Hourly Earnings over this period, most notably in the area of 
professional, scientific and technical activities where Average Hourly Earnings fell 
by €0.20 (-0.7 per cent).  
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FIGURE 46  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER HOUR (€), SEASONALLY 
ADJUSTED 
 
 
Source:  Earnings and Labour Costs Quarterly, Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
 
Figure 47 shows labour costs in Ireland compared to the Eurozone average 
before, during and after the financial crisis. In the post-crisis period there was a 
clear sizeable decrease in the relative cost of labour in Ireland. While in 2008 
labour costs were 15.1 per cent greater than the Eurozone average, in 2012 they 
were just 5.3 per cent greater. 
 
A large part of the story of the recovery in the Irish economy post-financial crisis 
has been export-led growth.17 As labour costs are one of the key factors which 
impact on the competiveness of domestic firms in international markets, it is 
likely that the large fall in labour costs over this time had a significant bearing on 
the turnaround in fortunes for the Irish economy. While labour costs have 
remained relatively low in recent years, a slight increase was observed in 2018 
compared to the previous year. As the labour market continues to tighten, it is 
likely that labour costs will continue to rise which may impact the competiveness 
of Irish businesses in the international market.  
 
 
                                                          
 
17   McQuinn K. and P. Varthalitis (2019). ‘How openness to trade rescued the Irish economy’, in Campos, N., P. De 
Grauwe and Ji Yuemei (Eds), Structural Reforms and Economic Growth in Europe (forthcoming), Cambridge University 
Press. 
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FIGURE 47 IRISH LABOUR COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE LABOUR COSTS IN THE 
EUROZONE (%) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
Continued strong growth in the Irish economy should see the labour market 
improve further with the unemployment rate expected to average 4.5 per cent in 
2019. As the labour market reaches full employment we expect the 
unemployment rate to fall at an increasingly slower pace and to average 4.1 per 
cent in 2020. Employment levels are expected to average 2.32 million in 2019 and 
2.38 million in 2020. Due to the tightening labour market we expect nominal 
earnings to increase by 4.4 per cent in 2019 and by 4.6 per cent in 2020. These 
growth rates are likely to stoke inflationary pressures and may lead to a 
deterioration in competiveness, in particular if the unemployment rate drops 
near 4 per cent.  
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
For the first four months of 2019, Exchequer receipts have increased by 3.5 per 
cent on an annual basis. This is comparable to the similar figures for 2017 and 
2018 (3.7 and 3.6 per cent respectively). All tax headings with the exception of 
corporation tax registered robust growth in 2019, with excise duty and capital 
gains tax, in particular, experiencing significant growth. Figure 48 illustrates the 
annual changes in taxation returns for the last four years for the main tax 
categories as well as the overall total amount. 
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FIGURE 48 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS: JANUARY TO APRIL (%) 
 
 
Source:  Department of Finance. 
 
While it is too early in the year to read too much into the significant decline in 
corporation tax receipts (28 per cent), it is worth bearing in mind that receipts 
from corporation tax experienced a significant increase in 2018 of 24 per cent. As 
noted in the previous Commentary, the particularly high levels of these receipts 
gives rise to the possibility of windfall tax receipts. If a significant element of 
taxation receipts are windfall in nature, this raises questions about the 
sustainability over the medium term of this source of revenue.  
 
Pay-related social insurance (PRSI) has seen an increase of over 5 per cent in 
2019; this suggests the underlying economy is continuing to perform strongly as 
these receipts are closely related to developments in the labour market. In terms 
of gross voted expenditure, Table 5 shows that for the year to date, both current 
and capital expenditure are progressing in accordance with ‘profile’ or 
Government forecasts at the start of the year. 
 
TABLE 5  CAPITAL AND CURRENT GROSS VOTED EXPENDITURE (€BILLION) – ACTUAL AND PROFILE 
(JANUARY TO APRIL) 
 
Actual Profile % Difference 
Current 18.82 18.97 0.8 
Capital 1.42 1.42 0.1 
Total 20.25 20.39 0.7 
 
Source:  Department of Finance. 
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Despite the strong increases in taxation receipts, we still believe that the General 
Government Balance will be back in deficit both in 2019 and 2020. This is mainly 
because the achievement of a mild surplus in 2018 was due in part to the 
exceptionally strong nature of corporation tax receipts in that year. With more 
modest increases in corporation tax forecast for 2019 and 2020, an overall deficit 
is now likely to occur. Given the strong growth forecasts for the Irish economy 
overall, the likelihood of government deficits over the next two years is a 
particular concern. Running a mild surplus in budgetary terms at this stage would 
help to take some demand-side pressures out of the economy while also enabling 
the provision of financial buffers when the economic cycle changes. 
 
Figure 49 presents the debt-to-GDP and GNI* ratios associated with our fiscal 
forecasts. From this it can be seen that debt-to-GDP is expected to fall to less 
than 60 per cent in 2020, while debt-to-GNI* is expected to fall to just under 
96 per cent for the same year. The high level of debt-to-GNI* highlights the 
continued vulnerability of the Irish sovereign from an indebtedness perspective. 
It also re-emphasises the need for prudent fiscal policies which allow a reduction 
in indebtedness over time. A sustained reduction in debt over time provides 
buffers to borrow in future when downturns arise.  
 
FIGURE 49 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
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General Assessment 
 
Notwithstanding the observed slowdown in international macroeconomic 
conditions, the Irish economy continues to experience robust economic growth in 
2019. Taxation receipts and labour market data both indicate that the economy is 
performing well with growth likely to be 4 per cent in the present year. The 
unemployment rate has fallen below 5 per cent for the first time since 2007 and 
we expect it will continue to drop into 2020. As with previous Commentaries, all 
forecasts are subject to the assumption that the United Kingdom remains in the 
European Union.  
 
Heightened uncertainty, however, is still very much a feature of present 
economic conditions with the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index, for 
example, registering a significant downturn in households’ expectations since 
November 2018. Inevitably, much of this uncertainty is due to the ongoing issue 
of Brexit and the potential nature of the UK’s exit from the European Union. 
While a wide variety of studies such as Bergin et al. (2019) have quantified the 
cost to the Irish economy over the medium term of different Brexit scenarios, it is 
increasingly clear that Brexit has already had an adverse impact on Irish economic 
activity in advance of the UK’s actual departure particularly via the 
subcomponent of consumer expectations. McQuinn, in a box to the Commentary, 
examines the potential impact of Brexit on Irish consumer sentiment. Evidence in 
the box suggests that the typical determinants of consumer sentiment 
(unemployment and inflation) are unable to explain the sharp downturn in Irish 
sentiment observed over the past 8/9 months. Therefore, a priori, the increased 
attention devoted to Brexit and the significant uncertainty surrounding the 
outcome appears to have had a materially negative impact on Irish consumer 
sentiment. Given the observed relationship between sentiment and actual 
economic decisions, this suggests that the growth performance of the Irish 
economy has already been adversely impacted by Brexit.  
 
Uncertainty from international sources is also highly relevant in terms of 
investment decisions made domestically. In another box to the Commentary 
O’Toole examines the impact of US policy uncertainty on investment decisions 
taken in the Irish economy. The box shows that Irish investment at a 
macroeconomic level, in particular machinery and equipment assets, is more 
highly correlated with international economic uncertainty rather than domestic 
developments. This is unsurprising given the highly globalised nature of the Irish 
economy and the impact of multinationals on aggregate investment trends. The 
results underscore the importance of international events for the domestic 
economy. It also further reinforces the risks of an economic downturn 
domestically if the international economy deteriorates.  
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The continued improvement in key domestic labour market variables has resulted 
in a sustained increase in both nominal and real wage growth in the Irish 
economy. Average Hourly Earnings were estimated to have grown by over 4 per 
cent in 2018 with similar or potentially higher rates of growth expected in 2019 
and 2020. Despite recent acceleration in the rate of inflation, price increases 
remain considerably below the growth rate in earnings. A continuation of this 
trend will see further increases in real wage growth which we expect to be just 
under 3 per cent over the coming years. While the increase in wages should 
reflect increases in underlying productivity in the Irish labour force, it is also a key 
indicator of potential overheating in the economy. Given that the labour market 
is currently at full employment, and there is evidence of increasing price levels, 
fiscal policy will have to be particularly disciplined in ensuring that 
competitiveness in the domestic economy is maintained. As noted in McQuinn 
and Varthalitis (2019), the restoration in competitiveness after the international 
financial downturn in 2007/2008 was one of the key reasons for the rebalancing 
of the Irish economy away from the disproportionate influence of the 
construction (non-tradable) sector and back to the more productive tradable 
sector.18 Achieving a balance between growth emanating from domestic activity 
and that from foreign trade is essential for the sustainable evolution of the 
economy.  
 
Given the expected increase in capital expenditure over the short to medium 
term, it may be advisable to run an explicitly counter-cyclical fiscal policy and 
instigate a mildly contractionary budget. Taxation increases in the area of carbon 
taxes or residential property taxes could be used to reduce some of the demand-
side pressures which are now evident in the domestic economy. These measures 
would also avoid the distortionary effects for employment of any changes in 
taxes on labour.  
 
The need for fiscal vigilance in that regard is reinforced by the recent cost over-
runs in the case of certain high profile capital projects. Over the medium term the 
Irish State is facing increasing budgetary pressures in areas such as healthcare 
provision (see Wren et al., 201719 for details), while the National Development 
Plan (NDP) has outlined an ambitious capital investment programme over the 
period 2018 and 2027. It is clear that the Government is to increase its scale of 
expenditure considerably over the decade ahead, therefore, vigilance is required 
over both the short and medium term to ensure that value for money is achieved 
where significant outlays of taxpayers’ money is concerned. Specifically, when it 
 
                                                          
 
18  McQuinn, K. and P. Varthalitis (2019). ‘How openness to trade rescued the Irish economy’.  
19 Wren M.A., C. Keegan, B. Walsh, A. Bergin, J. Eighan, A. Brick, S. Connolly, D. Watson and J. Banks (2017). Projections 
of demand for healthcare in Ireland, 2015-2030, first report from the Hippocrates model. ESRI Research series No. 67. 
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comes to large infrastructural projects, it is evident that improvements in the 
processes overseeing such projects are required such that the initial estimates of 
certain projects should more accurately predict final costs. 
 
From a general governance perspective, it is also somewhat disquieting that 
there is such a significant difference in opinion between the views of the 
Department of Public Expenditure and the Government on the National 
Broadband plan. The forecasted sums of public money involved are substantial in 
nature. The Celtic Tiger saw a number of projects where public money was not 
utilised in an efficient or prudent manner; it is imperative that the mistakes of 
that particular period are not repeated going forward.  
 
Part of the general strategy for broadening the tax base in the coming years 
should be a sustained increase in carbon taxes. The benefit of such a policy is to 
both widen the tax base but also assist climate policy. However, some of the 
difficulty in implementing these measures is the degree to which lower income 
households are affected by such a policy. In a paper to this Commentary, Tovar 
Reaños and Lynch (2019) examine the impact of increased carbon taxation on 
both carbon emissions and household income and equality. Microdata from the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) are used to estimate the effects of carbon 
taxation on both energy- and non-energy-related commodities expenditure. This 
research also considers the impact of recycling the carbon revenue back to 
households, using both a flat allocation and a targeted allocation. The results 
demonstrate that carbon taxes are an effective means of reducing emissions. For 
example, a 30 per cent increase in carbon taxes could result in a 3.3 per cent 
reduction in carbon emissions; emissions would reduce by over 8 per cent if taxes 
were increased by €80. Additionally, the research indicates that carbon taxes, 
when coupled with appropriate revenue recycling, has the capacity to reduce 
income inequality. Therefore, carbon taxation can help policymakers achieve a 
variety of objectives if implemented in a precise and imaginative manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 192.9 8.0 11.9 208.2 4.6 3.3 217.9 4.7 3.2 228.3 
Tourism 5.0 5.3 3.9 5.2 3.2 3.2 5.4 3.2 3.2 5.6 
Other Services 154.7 10.1 5.3 170.3 7.2 6.1 182.5 7.2 5.9 195.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 8.9 8.9 383.8 5.7 4.2 405.8 5.8 4.3 429.4 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     0.0     -0.7     -0.5 
Adjusted Exports 352.6 8.9 8.9 383.8 5.6 4.2 405.2 5.8 4.3 428.8 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 5.4 35.0 24.4 7.3 28.8 24.8 9.4 22.9 19.6 11.6 
Other Building 14.3 19.5 12.3 17.1 17.1 11.0 20.0 15.7 10 23.1 
Transfer Costs 1.2 36.7 24.5 1.6 13.4 8 1.8 11.3 7 2.0 
Building and Construction 21.8 24.3 15.9 27.1 20 17.8 32.5 14.5 12.9 38.3 
Machinery and Equipment 47.2 10.8 7.3 52.4 5.3 3.3 55.2 7.2 4.9 59.1 
Total Investment 69.0 15.1 9.8 79.4 10.3 7.1 87.7 11.1 7.6 97.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture 0.7 3.3 0.0 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.7 
Non-Agricultural 85.7 7.1 6.1 91.8 8.1 7.4 99.2 6.9 6.9 106.1 
Rental Income 10.0 7.6 0.8 10.8 7.4 0.8 11.6 7.2 0.8 12.4 
Other Income 15.7 3.4 0.5 16.3 7.1 1.2 17.4 2.2 0.4 17.8 
Total Income Received 112.1 6.6 7.4 119.5 7.9 9.4 128.9 6.3 8.1 137.1 
Current Transfers 8.6 -2.8 -0.2 8.4 -9.3 -0.8 7.6 -8.5 -0.6 6.9 
Gross Personal Income 120.7 5.9 7.2 127.9 6.7 8.6 136.5 5.5 7.5 144.0 
Taxes on Income and Wealth -22.2 6.1 -1.4 -23.5 4.1 -1.0 -24.5 5.0 -1.2 -25.7 
Personal Disposable Income 98.6 5.9 5.8 104.4 7.3 7.6 112.0 5.6 6.3 118.3 
Consumption 93.8 4.7 4.4 98.3 4.1 4.1 102.3 4.2 4.3 106.7 
Personal Savings 11.4 13.8 1.6 13.0 29.1 3.8 16.8 12.4 2.1 18.9 
Savings Ratio 11.2   11.9   14.3   15.2 
Average Personal Tax Rate 0.18   0.18   0.18   0.18 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 85.2 15.6 14.4 98.5 9.7 8.2 108.1 8.9 7.0 117.8 
Tourism 5.8 8.8 7.8 6.3 6.4 4.8 6.7 6.2 4.4 7.1 
Other Services 172.2 4.2 3.2 179.5 6.9 5.5 191.8 6.9 5.3 205.0 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 8.0 7.0 284.4 7.8 6.0 306.7 7.6 5.9 329.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0   -0.7   -0.8 
Adjusted Imports 263.3 8.0 7.0 284.4 7.6 6.0 305.9 7.6 5.9 329.1 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 383.8 405.2 428.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 284.4 305.9 329.1 
Net Factor Payments -59.8 -65.4 -75.6 -79.4 
Net Transfers -4.6 -5.1 -5.6 -6.1 
Balance on Current Account 24.9 29.0 17.9 14.0 
As a % of GNP 10.7 11.5 6.8 5.1 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 110.4 107.4 104.9 105.0 
Industry 412.1 423.2 435.2 446.7 
Of which: Construction 128.7 143.3 146.3 150.1 
Services 1,664.4 1,719.4 1,777.2 1,823.2 
Total at Work 2,194.6 2,249.9 2,324.2 2,374.7 
Unemployed 157.7 145.2 110.4 101.9 
Labour Force 2,352.2 2,395.1 2,434.6 2,476.6 
Unemployment Rate, % 6.7 5.7 4.5 4.1 
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CARBON TAXATION IN IRELAND. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF 
REVENUE RECYCLING POLICIES1 
 
Miguel Angel Tovar Reaños* and Muireann Lynch 
ABSTRACT 
We calculate the impact of an increase in carbon taxation on carbon emissions 
and on income inequality. Carbon emissions reduce by 3.94 per cent for a carbon 
tax increase of €30 per tonne, and 10.24 per cent for an increase of €80 per 
tonne. Carbon taxation is found to be regressive, with poorer households 
spending a greater proportion of their income on the tax than more affluent 
households. However, returning the carbon tax revenues to households reverses 
this regressive effect, and the net policy effect is progressive. A ‘carbon cheque’ 
that distributes the revenues equally to every household leads small changes in 
income inequality, while a targeted mechanism that directs more of the revenues 
towards less affluent households is more progressive, and actually reduces 
income inequality. The targeted mechanism resembles recycling the revenues 
through the tax and welfare system, and thus has lower administrative costs than 
a ‘carbon cheque’.  
INTRODUCTION      
Carbon pricing or taxation has been endorsed by many as an important tool in 
combatting climate change by reducing carbon emissions in the most cost-
effective manner, while inducing minimal distortions in other markets (Nordhaus, 
1993). The general principle of carbon taxation as an appropriate mechanism to 
reduce carbon emissions enjoys broad support amongst economists.2 
 
However, significant public concerns over carbon taxation remain. Energy 
affordability is an important consideration for citizens, as is the extent to which 
carbon taxes impact on income inequality (Kolstad et al., 2014). Because poorer 
households spend a greater share of their income on energy, carbon taxes can 
impact on both energy affordability and income inequality. The impact of carbon 
taxation on rural households is also of concern. Finally, the ability of carbon 
 
                                                          
 
1  Tovar Reaños and Lynch acknowledge funding from the ESRI’s Energy Policy Research Centre. We are grateful to 
Ankita Gaur and Ciarán MacDomhnaill for assistance with data processing and to ESRI seminar participants and an 
anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors or omissions are our own. 
* Corresponding author: miguel.angeltovar@esri.ie 
2  See for example www.econstatement.org 
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taxation to bring about a decrease in emissions, particularly if households are 
unable to readily switch to alternative fuels, is sometimes questioned (Patt and 
Lilliestam, 2018; Vasilakou, 2010).  
 
At least some of these concerns can be addressed by appropriate recycling of the 
revenue raised by carbon taxation. If the revenue is returned to households, 
either directly or via the tax and welfare systems, concerns over energy 
affordability can be addressed. Assuming the revenue received by each 
household is at least as great as the household expenditure on carbon tax, there 
is no net effect on energy affordability. Furthermore, appropriate targeting of the 
recycled revenues can leave income inequality unchanged, or even reduced. 
Klenert et al. (2018) provide a thorough review of the range of the various 
revenue recycling mechanisms that can be employed by policymakers.  
 
The choice of recycling mechanism is very important because a poorly designed 
instrument could exacerbate rather than attenuate an increase in income 
inequality caused by the tax itself (see Williams, 2016). The cost of implementing 
the policy itself should also be taken into consideration. For example, the 
administrative cost of recycling revenue through a direct transfer is likely to be 
higher than that of changing taxation and social welfare payment rates and 
thresholds. This higher administration cost reduces the total amount of revenue 
available for distribution amongst households. 
 
In Ireland, carbon is seen as a core element of the transition to a sustainable 
economy (DCCAE, 2017) and a carbon tax was introduced in 2010, which applies 
to the non-ETS (Emissions Trading Scheme) sector only. There is broad political 
agreement that this tax should be increased (Committee on Climate Action, 
2019). New research on the implications of increased carbon taxes for emissions, 
affordability and inequality is therefore warranted and is the focus of this 
research. 
 
Research on carbon taxation in Ireland has been carried out since as early as 1992 
(FitzGerald and McCoy, 1992). Several of the studies take a macroeconomic 
perspective and model the economy as a whole. As a result, these can calculate 
the impact of carbon taxation on various sectors of the economy as well as on 
households (Bergin et al., 2004; Wissema and Dellink, 2007; Conefrey et al., 
2013). They can also calculate the changes in behaviour induced by carbon 
taxation and the resulting reduction in emissions. However, these models cannot 
take account of individual household characteristics and behaviour, and do not 
consider how different categories of household are affected by carbon taxation, 
which requires the use of microdata. Research on carbon taxation that does rely 
on Irish microdata includes Scott and Eakins, 2004 and Callan et al., 2009. Carbon 
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taxes are found by each of the above papers to be regressive, but this literature 
also finds that the regressive effects can be reversed if the revenue raised from 
the tax is recycled appropriately back to households. However these models are 
unable to account for behavioural changes as a result of the tax, and instead 
assume that household carbon emissions continue unabated after the tax is 
introduced. While this may be a plausible short-run assumption, it is unlikely to 
apply in the long run. 
 
This research represents a significant advance on the state of the art by 
examining the impact of increased carbon taxation on both carbon emissions and 
household income and equality. Carbon taxation mainly affects household 
expenditure on energy-related commodities like fuel and transport, as these 
goods become more expensive. However, carbon taxation also affects 
expenditure on non-energy-related commodities by shifting the share of the 
household budget that is spent on each type of commodity. In order to estimate 
the effects of carbon taxation on expenditure on both energy- and non-energy-
related commodities, we use microdata from the Household Budget Survey of 
Ireland (HBS). This research also considers the impact of recycling the carbon 
revenue back to households, using both a flat allocation and a targeted 
allocation. 
 
Our results show that carbon taxes are an effective means of reducing both CO2 
emissions and income inequality when the tax revenue is properly allocated and 
targeted to protect vulnerable households. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
2.1  Demand system estimation 
We employ the Exact Aﬃne Stone Index demand system (EASI, see Lewbel and 
Pendakur, 2009) to model household behaviour. A demand system is a method of 
determining how consumer behaviour responds to changes in prices. 
Consumption decisions are represented as a system of equations which depend 
on prices, consumption budgets, and observed as well as unobserved household 
characteristics. Unlike previous models of household demand, the EASI allows for 
a flexible representation of the relationship between household expenditure on a 
particular commodity and the household’s total disposable income. Demand 
systems have been used to study households’ energy use and carbon emissions 
(Creedy and Sleeman, 2006; Pashardes et al., 2014; Tovar Reaños and Wolfing, 
2018), but, to our knowledge, this study which employs the EASI demand system 
to examine the distributional implications of carbon taxation, taking revenue 
recycling into account, is unique in the literature. It is also the first study to apply 
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the EASI to Irish data. The outputs of the model can be used to estimate a 
household expenditure function, which represents the quantities of each 
commodity consumed by a household, given that the household faces a budget 
restriction. Changes in the price of one commodity, for example increasing 
energy prices due to a carbon tax, means households will choose a different 
bundle of commodities in response: in other words, their expenditure on all 
commodities will change, not just energy-related commodities. We quantify the 
cost to households from carbon taxation, by determining the adjustment in 
household income needed to accept a different commodity bundle.3 This cost will 
in turn change income distribution and consequently income inequality. We used 
Atkinson’s inequality index to measure these changes in income inequality (see 
Tovar Reaños and Wolfing, 2018).4 
 
To apply the model, data on household expenditure on different commodities, 
commodity prices and other socioeconomic variables are needed. Using the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) from the Central Statistical Office (CSO), we use 
the following waves from the HBS to estimate our demand system; 2015-2016, 
2009, 2004, 1999 and 1994. We group consumption goods into six categories: 
food, housing, heating and lighting, transport, education and leisure, and other 
goods and services.5 A similar approach has been used in Tovar Reaños and 
Wolfing (2018) and by Bohringer et al. (2017). The grouping largely follows the 
Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP). As in 
Baker et al. (1989) we do not include purchase of vehicles and big appliances such 
as washing machines, dryers, etc. as part of the commodity bundles. Instead, 
dummy variables for ownership of these commodities are included in the 
analysis. Energy is comprised of expenditure on electricity, natural gas, liquid 
fuels and solid fuels. Transport expenditure comprises petrol and/or diesel, 
vehicular maintenance, insurance and public transport. Because carbon taxes 
affect the prices of both heating and fuels for private transportation,6 we can 
estimate the changes in income distribution for both groups.  
 
A potential caveat is that the parameters for transportation include both public 
and private transport. However, once we compared our results with a model that 
only includes private transport, our results are slightly higher, and the general 
 
                                                          
 
3  After estimating an expenditure function we are able to estimate Hicks’ equivalent variation.  
4  We follow King (1983) to estimate equivalent income and inequality. 
5  This aggregation maximises the use of the data because it considerably reduces the number of households reporting 
zero expenditure in any given category.  
6  While expenditure on electricity is included in the HBS dataset and in our model, carbon taxes do not apply to 
electricity consumption because electricity generation is covered by the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS). Therefore a change in carbon tax changes the prices of heating and transportation fuels, but not of electricity. 
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conclusion found in this report holds.7 Full details of the model can be found in 
Tovar Reaños and Lynch, 2019. 
2.2 Energy consumption with no carbon taxation increase 
Figure 1 shows that low income households spend the largest share of their 
budget on residential energy. The consumption in this sector comprises electricity 
and fuels for heating. Similar patterns are found for the expenditure on private 
transportation as shown in Figure 2. This shows that higher energy prices (via a 
carbon tax or otherwise) will potentially harm low income households 
disproportionally. This tallies with results from previous research. 
 
FIGURE 1  BUDGET SHARE OF EXPENDITURE ON HEATING AND LIGHTING USED IN THE 
RESIDENTIAL SECTOR ACROSS EXPENDITURE QUARTILES  
 
 
Source:  Own estimation based on the HBS. 
 
 
                                                          
 
7  We use a Heckman correction to estimate a demand system for only vehicle owners as in West and Williams (2007). 
For full details of this estimation see Tovar et al., 2019. 
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FIGURE 2  BUDGET SHARE OF EXPENDITURE ON DIESEL AND PETROL USED IN PRIVATE 
TRANSPORTATION ACROSS EXPENDITURE QUARTILES 
 
 
Source:  Own estimation based on the HBS. 
 
FIGURE 3  CARBON EMISSIONS BY INCOME QUARTILE (TONNES) 
 
 
Source:  Own estimation based on the HBS. 
 
Figure 3 shows the carbon emissions per household. More affluent households 
have higher emissions. This calls for the implementation of a progressive policy 
instrument where carbon taxes increase with income. 
MICROSIMULATION  
Having determined the expenditure of each income quartile on fuels and 
transportation, we now determine the impact of a change in carbon taxation on 
behaviour. This is the major contribution of this piece of research. For this 
exercise, we use only the 2015-2016 wave of the HBS because it has the most 
recent data. In addition, we use emission factors and prices of energy 
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commodities provided by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI).8 As 
in Callan et al. (2009), we only consider direct emissions. 
 
It is important to note here that the model is a partial equilibrium model, and 
consequently it is not able to estimate changes in labour supply or in the supply 
of commodities purchased by households as a result of carbon taxes. This will be 
the focus of future research. 
SCENARIOS  
We analyse two carbon tax scenarios, where we consider an additional carbon 
tax of €30 and €80 per tonne respectively. When combined with the existing 
carbon tax of €20 per tonne, total carbon taxes come to €50 and €100 per tonne. 
In the baseline scenario, households pay the current carbon tax (i.e. €20 per 
tonne).  
 
Furthermore, we analyse two mechanisms for recycling the additional carbon tax 
revenue; a flat allocation and a targeted allocation. The flat allocation scenario 
resembles the green cheque, which has been advocated by some policymakers; 
an equal cash transfer is given to every household, the sum total of which is equal 
to the total carbon tax revenue. Under the targeted scenario, the revenue is 
distributed amongst households in inverse proportion to the households’ share of 
aggregate income, according to the following equations: 
∑ 𝑋ℎ
𝐻
ℎ
𝑋ℎ
=  𝑟ℎ 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑋ℎ =  
𝑟ℎ
∑ 𝑟ℎℎ
 
 
where 𝑋ℎ is each household’s total expenditure and 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑋ℎ calculates the 
share of the total carbon tax revenues that accrue to each household ℎ. The first 
equation calculates the inverse of each household’s share of aggregate 
expenditure, and the second equation normalises this in order to ensure that the 
sum of all the shares to adds to one. 
 
This allocation mechanism is designed to resemble social welfare transfers, which 
broadly accrue to households in inverse proportion to income (with some 
exceptions). 
 
                                                          
 
8  Emission factors can be found at www.seai.ie/resources/publications/Energy-Emissions-2017-Final.pdf 
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RESULTS9 
5.1  Initial incidence 
5.1.1  Household level  
Table 1 displays how the cost of increasing the carbon tax by an additional €30 
per tonne falls on the household types with the largest incidence across the 
income quartiles as a proportion of total expenditure. Every household bears 
some cost, but the cost is greatest for the poorest households. Comparing the 
ﬁrst and fourth quartiles indicates that poorer households (1st quartile) suffer 
disproportionately more from carbon taxes. In addition, single households with 
children are the most affected by this policy.  
 
It should be noted here that this table includes no assumption on how the 
revenues from carbon taxes are utilised. In essence, the table shows the cost of 
increasing the carbon tax but assumes that the revenue raised from so doing exits 
the economy entirely. We relax this assumption further on. Note that our metric 
measures the cost of the policy as the extra income that the household would 
require, were they to choose their original bundle of commodities, but at the new 
set of energy prices.  
 
TABLE 1 HICK’S EQUIVALENT VARIATION RELATIVE TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
  1st_quartile 2nd_quartile 3rd_quartile 4th_quartile 
Single_no_children -0.83 -0.41*** -0.34*** -0.23*** 
Single_+65 -0.94 -0.58 -0.41 -0.16*** 
Single_with_children -1.01*** -0.67*** -0.45 -0.37 
All_households -0.88 -0.59 -0.48 -0.39 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
Notes: Statistically signiﬁcant with respect to the sample mean in each quartile *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
The following graph shows how the tax burden is distributed across different 
expenditure quartiles. In addition, the graph is broken down by rural and urban 
households.10 One can see that rural households are disproportionally more 
affected, particularly rural households in the lowest income quartile. 
 
 
                                                          
 
9  Own-price, cross-price and expenditure elasticities can be found in Tovar et al., 2019. 
10  Rural and urban households are defined by the CSO regarding population size and proximity with aggregated town 
areas (see www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cp1hii/cp1hii/bgn). 
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FIGURE 4  DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CARBON TAX FOR URBAN AND RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation.  
 
Table 2 shows the average cost per week of carbon taxation on different 
household types in monetary terms. Households living in older dwellings and low 
skilled workers have larger costs. Callan et al. (2009) used a different approach 
and estimated an average cost per week of more than €4 for an additional carbon 
tax of €20 per tonne. Our results are at the lower bound of this estimate, which is 
inevitable as our model includes the behavioural effects of carbon taxation. We 
can simulate the extent to which households will reduce their carbon 
consumption as a result of the tax, thereby reducing the tax that they pay (as well 
as reducing total emissions). 
 
TABLE 2 CARBON TAX COST (€/WEEK). OWN ESTIMATED HICK’S EQUIVALENT VARIATION 
 
Tax_+30 Tax_+80 
Dwelling_1980 -3.037*** -7.467 *** 
Low_skill -3.126 *** -7.726 *** 
All_households -2.772 -6.841 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
Notes:  Values have been equalised to consider household size. Statistically signiﬁcant with respect to the sample mean in each 
quartile. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, **p<0.01. 
 
5.1.2 Aggregated level  
The cost of the policy faced by households estimated in the previous section will 
also have distributional effects at aggregate level. Table 3 shows the changes in 
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4M
ea
n
 e
q
u
iv
al
en
t 
va
ri
at
io
n
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
Expenditure quartile
Rural Urban
€30 CO2 tax increase €80 CO2 tax increase
78 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r  2 01 9  
 
income inequality, total expenditure per capita and CO2 emissions as a result of 
the carbon tax. In the absence of revenue recycling, income inequality, as 
measured by the Atkinson index, increases. This is due to the regressive nature of 
carbon taxation. In addition, after paying for the carbon tax, the total expenditure 
of households declines by between 0.46 per cent and 1.14 per cent. A tax 
increase of €30 and €80 per tonne decreases CO2 emissions by 3.94 per cent and 
10.24 per cent respectively, due to the behavioural changes made by households 
in response to the tax. 
 
TABLE 3 CHANGES IN INEQUALITY, EXPENDITURE AND EMISSIONS IN % 
Tax Inequality % Expenditure % Emissions % 
+€30 0.40 -0.46 -3.94 
+€80 1.04 -1.14 -10.24 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
5.2  Revenue recycling  
We now consider the effects of recycling carbon tax revenue to households. 
Figure 5 shows how the cost of an additional €80 per tonne changes when the flat 
and targeted allocations described above are used. A flat allocation, while equal 
in monetary terms for each household, is larger in comparison to total 
expenditure for poorer households than for richer households. For this reason, 
the flat allocation compensates poorer households more than richer households 
as a proportion of expenditure. However, a more targeted measure benefits the 
poorest households far more than the flat measure. The targeted measure is 
therefore more progressive, which is appropriate given that higher income 
households emit higher levels of carbon. 
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FIGURE 5  DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT REVENUE RECYCLING MECHANISM 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation.  
 
Administrative costs are not included in this analysis, but it should be noted here 
that the administrative cost of the targeted scenario is likely to be lower than that 
of the flat allocation. This is due to the fact that the flat allocation would most 
likely have to be achieved by implementing a new mechanism in which a cash 
payment is delivered to each household, and there is currently no national 
register of households in the State. In contrast, the targeted mechanism proposal 
is along the lines of that proposed in Callan et al. (2009), in which the revenues 
are recycled through the existing tax and welfare system. It is unlikely that the 
targeted mechanism proposed here could be replicated with 100 per cent 
accuracy via the existing tax and social welfare mechanisms, but the general 
principle of a targeted mechanism being preferable to a flat allocation has been 
established.  
 
In order to evaluate the general effects of the policies, Table 4 shows the effects 
of the tax increase and revenue recycling on inequality and expenditure. A flat 
allocation can reduce inequality and increase the average expenditure available 
for households. Recycling mechanisms can thus not only reverse the regressive 
effects of carbon taxation, but can actually reduce rather than increase income 
inequality. The targeted mechanism has even larger effects, potentially doubling 
the benefits obtained by the flat allocation mechanism. 
 
The degree to which recycling mechanisms can reduce income inequality 
increases as carbon taxation increases. This is because higher carbon taxes yield 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 2 3 4
M
ea
n
 e
q
u
iv
al
en
t 
va
ri
at
io
n
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
Expenditure quartile
No allocation Flat allocation Targeted allocation
80 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r  2 01 9  
 
higher revenues, and so if appropriate recycling mechanisms are chosen, the 
reductions in inequality are greater. 
 
TABLE 4 CHANGES IN INEQUALITY, EXPENDITURE: DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TWO  
RE-ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 
Flat allocation  
Carbon tax Inequality % Expenditure % 
+€30 -0.46 0.16 
+€80 -1.05 0.41 
Targeted allocation 
Carbon tax Inequality % Expenditure % 
+€30 -1.23 0.16 
+€80 -2.78 0.41 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimation. 
CONCLUSION 
This work examined the impact of increased carbon taxation in Ireland, and 
quantified the impact of same on carbon emissions using Irish microlevel data for 
the first time. Our results find a 3.94 per cent reduction in carbon emissions if 
carbon taxes are increased by €30 per tonne, and an 10.24 per cent reduction in 
emissions if taxes are increased by €80 per tonne. The evidence suggests that 
carbon taxation is a valid and important part of climate policy. 
 
Results from previous research, which find that carbon taxes are regressive, are 
repeated here. The impact on rural households is particularly evident. However, 
the fact that appropriate revenue recycling can reverse these regressive effects 
diminishes the validity of distributional issues as an argument against increasing 
carbon taxation. In fact, carbon taxation coupled with revenue recycling has the 
potential to be a useful tool for mitigating income inequality, independent of 
climate policy. In our scenario, the flat allocation mimics the carbon cheque, 
which has been proposed as a potential revenue recycling mechanism in Ireland. 
While this re-allocation mechanism can reduce inequality, our alternative 
scenario of the targeted mechanism can bring larger reductions in income 
inequality.  
 
Our model does not estimate the overall macroeconomic cost of policy reforms 
because it is a partial equilibrium model. In the same line, our changes in CO2 
emissions are direct emissions and do not consider the overall changes in 
emissions. Further research is needed to have a macro and micro vison of the 
cost of the policy reform. Finally, it should be noted that our results simulate 
behavioural changes based on historical data, which are influenced by the 
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climate, energy and other policies in place at the time the data were collected. 
Future climate and energy policies, independent of carbon taxation, have the 
potential to shift behaviour even further. For example, measures such as 
improved public transportation or congestion charging in city centres could 
reduce the level of carbon taxation at which commuters move away from private 
motorised transportation and towards public transport and/or walking or cycling. 
In other words, these policies would increase the price-responsiveness of 
commuters to carbon taxation, resulting in even greater emission reductions for a 
given level of carbon taxation. The interplay between carbon taxation and other 
climate and energy policies should therefore be taken into consideration by 
policymakers. 
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